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abstract
The Balkan Peninsula was one of the hot spots that saw the most destructive nationalist 
conflicts since the late nineteenth century. In the 1990s, many conflict that remained their 
long slumber during the Cold War came to the fore one again with the removal of the 
block disciplines. Macedonia is among them and merits attention in that it constitutes a 
eepicenter of a new Balkan turmoil blast of which may drag the Balkans in a general war. 
The study aims at examining the parallels between the past and present forms of the 
Macedonian question in terms of its belligerents, their reference points on on which they 
base their policies toward Macedonia, and approachment of the great powers toward the 
problem.
Ill
ÖZET
Balkan Yarimadasi 19. yüzyıldan bu yana en yikici milliyetçi catismalara sahne olmuştur. 
Soğuk Savaş boyunca uykuya yatirilan pek cok catisma blok disiplininin ortadan 
kalkmasiyla beraber tekrar sahneye cikmislardir. Makedonya sorunu bunlar arasindadir ve 
tum Balkanlar! genel bir savasa sürükleyebilecek bir deprem merkezi olarak önem 
arzetmektedir. Bu bağlamda, calismanin amaci, geçmiş ve bugunku Makedonya sorunu 
arasindaki parallellikleri catismanin taraflar!, Makedonya’ya yönelik politikalarini dayanak 
yaptiklari referans noktalar! ve buyuk devletlerin soruna yaklasimlari acisindan 
incelemektir.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Macedonia had been one of the hottest spots of the Balkan Peninsula in the late nineteenth 
century. The complex ethnic composition of the region and challenging identity of its inhabitants 
as well as fervent irredentism of the newly independent Balkan nations that run after the ideal of 
incorporation of the lands where their alleged brethren lived on, had turned the region into a 
ceaseless conflict arena.
The Macedonian region was the last portion remaining from the famous ‘Eastern Question’ of the 
great powers of the time. But even after the withdrawal of the Ottomans from the region 
continued to be a ‘apple of discord’ until the establishment of a People’s Republic of Macedonia 
within a Socialist Yugoslavia, or it seemed to be so.
In this context, the aim of this study is to indicate that there are similarities between the past and 
present forms of the Macedonian Question in terms of its belligerents, the reference points upon 
which those belligerents based their policies toward Macedonia, and the approachements of the 
great powers to the matter.
For this aim, the first chapter of the study focuses on the conflict on Macedonia within a period 
spanning from the 1870s to the 1990s, whereas the second chapter examines the regional 
implications of the appearence of Macedonia as a sovereign state in the Balkan politics. Finally, 
last chapter investigates the approaches of the great powers and major international organizations 
to the problem in a different world order.
In this context it is hoped that the study will contribute to the works that were materialized on this 
case and constitute a considerable sources for those interested in the Macedonian Question and the 
other problems involved with it.
CHAPTER H: MACEDONIA; LAND, PEOPLE AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The historical, cultural, politial, economical, ethnic and even geographical phases of the 
Macedonian question are so complicated and controversial that it is almost impossible not to fall 
the trap of confusion when one meets with the challenging claims of the several resources. Even 
the geographical boundaries of the region changes so as to serve the national interests of the 
neighboring states. Obviously this situation is indebted its existence to the century-old conflict 
over Macedonia During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the belligerents of the conflict for 
the region defined and redefined the physical limits of the region in the ebb and flow of their 
struggles. ' Therefore, the challenging definitions had been derived from the strategic importance 
of the region
2.1 Geographical Definition and Importance of the Region
The generally accepted definition of the territorial limits of Macedonia envisages that the region 
called Macedonia covers a mostly mountainous terrain bound to the north by the Skopska Crna 
Gora and Shar Planina Mountains; to the east by the Rila and Rhodope Mountains; to the west by 
the lakes of Okhrid and Prespa. This area forms a geographic unit, and it is irrigated by three big 
rivers; Axios and Struma/Strimon flowing all the way to the Aegean Sea and after crossing the 
plentiful plains of the Khalkidi peninsula’s hinterland reaching up the sea near west and east of 
the most important port of the Balkans; Thessaloniki. This area covers approximately 67.000 
square kilometers,^ and now parted among three neighboring countries under different names. Its 
portion that now remains within the boundaries of modem Greece is called Aegean Macedonia
whereas the land part in Bulgaria along the Strumica river is known to be Pirin Macedonia. The 
remaining portion with the name of Vardar Macedonia points td the territories on which the 
current Macedonian state has been founded. Although a small slice of the region went to Albania 
this portion does not have a specific name.
The region possesses vitally important passages carrying vital importance for the powers that 
seek domination over the Balkans. The Vardar Plain links the Danube River to the Aegean 
whereas the Struma Plain is the most important passage connecting Sofia in the south with the 
sea. One of the most important imperial roads of the Roman Empire, Via Egnatia, stretches from 
the Adriatic to the Aegean through a route visiting Macedonian provinces of Okhrid, Bitola and 
Fiorina. In the south the most important city of the region is situated; Thessaloniki is the most 
important commercial center in that it is the only port through which the goods produced or 
needed by interior provinces can be exported or imported from the outside world.^
The Macedonian region commands the heart of the Balkan peninsula and is recalling the well- 
known “heartland” theory of Mahan. As one expert points out; “Macedonia contains the main 
north-south route from Central Europe and the Aegean down to Morava and Vardar Valleys', 
thus whoever controls the territory would posses a dominant strategic advantage and potential 
either to strengthen or lesion the dominant central European powers’ influence in the 
Mediterranean and even Middle East.”“*
2.2 Ethnic Composition of the Region
The second and most blatant discussion is around the ethnic composition of the region. The 
contenders of the conflicts for the region frequently have collected and interpreted data in such a
way as to best serve their political interests. The prevailed millet system that identified the 
subjects of the Ottoman Sultan according to their religious affiliations has contributed 
considerably to the complexity of the matter. Thus to apply the Turkish authorities’ reports, 
albeit they are only authentic documents, might not address the the problem altogether in that 
these documents subscribed both the Bulgarians and the Greeks living in Macedonia under the 
authority of the Phanar Patriarchate of Constantinople as Greek or “Roumeliot” and furthermore, 
described as “Bulgarian Greeks” who inhabited in the bishoprics of the Exarchate.’ Wilkinson 
illustrated that the maps drawn within a period spanning from 1730 to 1945 by interested, 
politically motivated, foreigners such as the British, the French, the Germans and the Russians, as 
well as by the main challengers and their spokesperson reflected the diversity of opinion on 
ethnographic composition in Macedonia.* Prevelakis holds that as a geographical entity 
Macedonia was “essentially an area of transition, both physically and culturally" and points out 
that the most accurate description of the ethnological and political complication of the region in 
the beginning of the twentieth century was made by the British Military Handbook of 1916;’
“The nationality of the population is subject of endless dispute. The most exhaustive studies 
are those of avowed partisans. A Serbian map shows the whole of Slav Macedonia to be 
Serbian; a Bulgarian map, Bulgarian; and if an attempt is made from an impartial point of 
view to learn the facts, the reply is that there are no established facts, except that a Greek 
population inhabits the coast region and that beyond this region the people are Slavs, 
whereas there are also a certain number of Turks, Romanians, Albanians and at Salónica, 
Spanish Jews. The Serb bases his claim on Serbian predominance in the fifteenth century, 
on folksongs, certain social customs, etc.; the Bulgar on the feeling of the people today and 
on the fact that the language used employs the terminal article peculiar to the Bulgarian 
tongue among Slav languages...the matter is complicated by the fact that, the population 
having belonged half a century ago to the Greek church, a section of Slavs calls itself 
Greek, although speaking Bulgarian the Serbs may insist that the same people are racially 
and potentially Serbs. In some cases the purest Slav may be the keenest Greek, just as the 
keenest Turk (the Pomaks, who are Mohammedan Slavs) are often the purest Bulgars in 
blood.”
To make a sense, one should glance at the results of surveys by the Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbs 
indicating the distribution of ethnic groups in Macedonia. The results reflect to what extent the 
protagonists employed the methodology of calculation which would best serve their causes and 
distorted the reality. All the surveys exaggerated the number of the compatriots of the 
researchers living in the region thereby forming a basis to claim right over the region.*
2.3 Historical Background
The prominent Macedonian kingdom was founded by the Greek-speaking tribes in southern 
Macedonia in about 700 DC. These Macedonians shared the same cultural features with the 
Greeks in the south; they worshipped the Greek deities like Zeus and Heracles and Macedonian 
kings considered themselves as the descendants of Heracles, the son of Zeus. The subordination 
of the Macedoman Kingdom to the southern Greek civilization ended with the successful 
statesmanship of Philip of Macedón and evolved into the domination over them during the reign 
of Alexander the Great. After the death of Alexander and dismemberment of his empire the 
peoples of the Greek peninsula and Macedonia lost their independence at the end of the military 
campaign of the new rising power of the Mediterranean, Rome in 167 BC. Under the Roman 
hegemony the region assumed the fimction of the line that parted the Roman world into its Latin 
and Greek halves. Latin was spoken from the Danube down to a line along Durres, Ohrid, 
Skopje, Stobi and Sofia all the way to the Black Sea. When the Roman Empire was splitted into 
two at the end of the fourth century AD., the border between the two halves was laying along the 
Drina River thereby leaving Macedonia in the eastern part with its population, albeit they were 
few, Latin-speakers who then was to be named by the Greeks as Koutzovlachs or Vlachs -meant 
shepherds. ^
After the collapse of the Roman Empire Slav tribes influxed into the region from the east-central 
Europe by the sixth century. The intensifying Slav incursions which contained proto-Bulgarians - 
or according to some historians, Petcheneks, a Turkish tribe came from the region of Ural and 
Volga basins- ended with the establishment of the first Bulgarian state in 681. These peoples 
were converted to Christianity mostly thanks to the Byzantine court’s two important envoys to 
the region. Cyril and Methodius managed to have the Slavic peoples of the region adopted an 
authentic script called ‘Church Slavonic’ or ‘old Bulgarian’.*® The growing hostilities between 
the Bulgarian power that sought to expand its control in the region at the expense of the 
Byzantine ended with the decisive defeat of King Samuel at the hand of the Byzantine Empire 
Basil II in 1014 -gained prominence with the name Basil the Bulgarian-slayer- and the Bulgarian 
kingdom founded around the Okhrid and Prespa Lakes fell firmly under the Byzantine control 
until 1230.**.
By the middle of the thirteenth century the region saw another power’s growth. The Serbs 
managed to extend their control inside Macedonia though their main strongholds were around 
the direction of south and southeast all the way to Kosovo/a. During the newly-founded Latin 
Empire which was established at the end of the Fourth Crusade of 1202, the Serbs initially 
adopted Catholicism rather than Orthodoxy in that Byzantium, the champion of the Orthodoxy 
was now discredited by the treasury of the crusaders. *^ The Serbian penetration into the region 
ascended its climax after the collapse of the Latin Empire in 1261, In 1282 the Serbian King 
Milutin seized Skopje from Byzantine Empire. The Serbian encroachments on the territory from 
the ailing Byzantine placed the kingdom of Stephan Dushan onto the position of the strongest
power of the Balkans in the middle of fourteenth century. Dushan’s empire stretched from the 
Danube to central Greece and from the Drina to western Thrace.
When the Ottoman power reached out the borders of Macedonia, the region was tom by internal 
strife. Nejaki, as his subjects called him,*  ^ the successor of the powerful Serbian King Dushan, 
tiad failed to mle the empire fairly and dragged his country into chaos. The decisive defeat of the 
Serbian armies at Cemomen -or in its Turkish acrimony “Sirpsindigi”- in 1371 around the 
Maritsa River stamped out the Serbian hegemony in Macedonia*^ and with the following Turkish 
victories at Samaku (1371), Cirmen (1372) the conquest of Macedonia was completed, and the 
Ottomans instmcted a new administration under the title of “Rumeli Beylerbeyliği” here.*’ The 
Ottoman Empire ruled Macedonia from 1370 onward until the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, which 
was to result in the expulsion of the Turks from their last bastion on the European continent. 
Naturally the outcome of the Turkish conquest of the region was the adjoining of a new ethnicity 
with different religious belief to the prevailing ones, the Turks.
The Ottoman mle brought the religion of Islam to the region with its canonical framework 
including millet system that classified the sultan’s subjects according to their religious affiliations. 
At the end of the consolidation of the Ottoman order, some of the peoples tended to adopt the 
conquerors’ religion whereas the rest was determined to preserve their religious identity that was 
to constitute one of the most important elements of the liberation movements of the nineteenth 
century. The Ottomans adopted the same methodology with the others who had founded empire- 
scale states that had contained several communities belonging to different cultures and religions. 
The insufficient technological and institutional facilities required the allowance of great autonomy 
to the communities essentially in their social life. While the authority of the sultan was over all
the institutions, community leaders exerted some sort of jurisdiction over the member of their 
community thereby controlling all spheres of their social life but in accordance with the 
regulations, which their holy books stipulated, rather than Shariat.
On the other hand, despite its administrative advantages, the millet system laid the seed of 
destruction; because firstly “it left the control of the education and of much of their own internal 
affairs in the hands of the millet system hierarchy itself, and outside official state control”.^ ® Thus 
the nationalistic ideologies that had its exodus from the French Revolution of 1789 comfortably 
penetrated into the members of millets and even caused fnction between the religious leaders and 
their subjects. Secondly the millet system allowed the Christian groups to retain the memoirs of 
their glorious past that was indivisibly linked with the territories on where they now lived, 
thereby laying down the foundations of the contemporary conflict over M acedonia . I t  is 
obvious that since the antiquity the peoples of the region attributed a fundamental value to the 
territory through the manipulation of symbols of autochtony.** On the other hand, it was obvious 
that just myths of the past were not enough to get the communities which had been united under 
the Christian ideals for centuries to plum into hostilities with each other; there needed gun 
powder to blast the bomb; that is nationalism.
The Orthodox millet system of the Ottoman Empire was controlled by the Phanar Patriarchate in 
Istanbul, at all quarters of which the preponderant position of the Greek clergy was clearly 
seen. The Ecumenical Patriarch of Istanbul in Phanar neighborhood was officially recognized as 
the supreme leader of the Orthodox Church. Under the tutelage of the Phanar, the social affairs 
of the community was regulated, though it was within the limits that the Ottoman 
administration's permission, according to the laws as the continuation of the former Roman Law
under the title of Patriarchal Law, which actually carried the very characteristics of the Byzantine 
judicial tradition. Initially the official law had been applied to the limited sphere of social life like 
marriages, divorces, inheritance and so forth; later on, its content was extended to include most 
of the legal relations which were interpreted to have been under the aegis of the Turkish rule.^° It 
was obvious that the Phanar Greeks used adeptly the Phanar Patriarchate to hellenize the 
populations of the Macedonian region through religious services and education under its scrutiny, 
and both of them performed in Greek. Thus, by the threshold of the nationalistic struggles most 
of the urban-educated localities were speaking Greek whereas the illiterate peasantry speaking
vernacular.21
2.4 The Emergence of the Macedonian Problem
In the late nineteenth century nationalistic ideologies transpassed all the barriers religious 
institutions had gradually permiated the Balkan peoples. The Orthodoxy under which all the 
Christian subjects of the sultan living in the Balkans had one identity, came to lose ground. “The 
period marked the fateful transition from the ecumenical community of Balkan Orthodoxy to a 
still new ideals inarticulate and uncertain world of modem linguistic nations”. Since the 
government decree of 1870, the subordinate nations gradually severed their ties with the Phanar 
and declared themselves autocephalus. That was the time for hostilities that had kept sleeping 
during the Ottoman reign.
The aforementioned superiority of the Phanar Patriarchate and its applications that overtly served 
the hellenization of the Macedonian populations was criticized also by the Slav elements of the 
Balkan Christianity who were intentionally excluded from the high offices of the court and
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discontented with the replacement of Slavonic by Greek. The prevailed system made the 
Phanariot Greeks the closest aides to the Sultan and deprived the Slav people of the most 
powerful instrument they might use against the Turks. Therefore the Slav historians of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries wrote frequently about the “double yoke” when they discussed 
the Ottoman period in the history of their country; the political and economic of the Ottomans 
and the religious and linguistic of the Greeks.
Nevertheless, although the Slavs objected to the Greek supremacy they were far away from being 
united. Hence, they had to wait for a determined defiance of the Slav people against both the 
Greeks and the Turks until the birth of *· . Bulgarian and Serbian nationalism in the nineteenth 
century On the other hand, once the Orthodoxy assumed the church and the state as identical, 
those who intended to create an independent Bulgaria or Serbia considered that the establishment 
of a national church should be the most logical step.^“*
2.4.1 The Ecclesiastical Crisis
In the age of nationalism the Bulgarians had stood aloof of the changes affecting the Greeks and 
the Serbs, essentially owing to their lack of a flourishing bourgeoisie class as was in the latter 
societies. Furthermore, some Bulgarians who had attained wealth and status in the main towns 
tended to become hellenized and merge into the Greek bourgeoisie.^* Bulgarian national 
consciousness was fostered by mostly by the churchmen in the monasteries. Within the long 
standing struggle against the Greek supremacy, the Bulgarians came to feel the need of a 
patriotic history which would instigate the Bulgarian nationalism and encourage the Bulgarian 
people to resist against the systematic hellenization in the hands of the Phanar.^^ The Bulgarian
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national awakening gathered momentum during the Russian campaign against the Turks in 1806- 
1812, and many Bulgarians helped Russian armies in the hope of materialization of their liberty. 
Nevertheless the Balkan peoples displayed great sympathy to the liberation struggles of their 
neighbors. As the Greeks revolted against the Porte, Balkan nationalism had not yet entered into 
the phase of mutually exclusive and antagonist movements.^’ In the reforms of 1839 Hatti-Sherif 
the rights to the Christian subjects of the Sultan were granted in written form and now for the 
Slav peoples, the turn was the formation of a separate millet to enjoy directly the said rights.^*
The Crimean War proved the time was ripe to move. Anti-Greek sentiments had been escalating 
since 1830s when effects of the nationalist propaganda and education along with the contending 
interests came to be felt in Macedonia and Bulgaria. The interest of the flourishing Bulgarian 
bourgeoisie class began to clash with the interests of the Phanariot Greeks in Istanbul and 
Bulgarian provinces. Thus the Bulgarians raised their demands for a specific contingent for the 
Bulgarian clergy in Macedonia and Roumeli and halt of the corruption and sales of offices. Upon 
the European powers’ demarch to the Porte for regulations that would redress the grievances of 
its Christian subjects and as a result of it, declaration of Hatti Humayun of 1856 which stipulated 
the reorganization of former millet system,the Bulgarians accelerated their efforts to acquire 
this purpose. At the request of the Porte the Patriarch had to call for a church council in 1860 to 
consider the changes. The outcome of the meeting was unfortunate for the Bulgarians 
particularly in that they were underrepresented in the council.^“
The Porte welcomed the ecclesiastical split between the two nations. For the Porte, this was 
some sort of a pacte-et-impera strategy because the existence of conflict between the two nations 
provided the Ottoman authorities with the ability to wield their control over the parties more
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effectively as mediators.^* Besides it, once the Greek nationalism was much more dangerous and 
the Bulgarians had not consolidated their nationhood yet, and for this reason they were more 
sensitive not to provoke the Porte, Turkish authorities overtly tolerated the Bulgarians and finally 
conceded to the establishment of a Bulgarian Church that would be subject to nominal 
recognition of the patriarchal supremacy .
With the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate the mutual nationalistic propaganda of the 
Bulgarians and the Greeks increased. The reason why the protagonists intensified their efforts to 
swing the population in Macedonia to their own sides was the fact that the Decree of 1870 gave 
the Exarchate only seventeen dioceses, Imt stipulated that the parishes should decide whether 
liturgies would be performed in vernacular or Greek. The efforts were not in vain, if one takes 
into account the suggestion of the Greek government, on the grounds that the ecclesiastical 
boundaries should be recognized as the national boundaries.^“* The Grand Synod of June 1872 
declared the Bulgarian Exarchate as schismatic and excommunicated it, thereby opening the field 
to nationalistic struggles. However behind the Greek and Bulgarian recalcitrance there were 
some practical outcomes of the protraction of the schism for both sides. According to the 
Greeks, “the schism helped the loyalties of Hellenism of a significant segment of Slav-speaking 
inhabitants who did not wish to compromise on their allegiance to the Ecumenical Patriarchate 
and to traditional loyalties and values”. On the Bulgarian side, “it provided a rallying point for 
whipping up nationalistic belligerency among the elite as well as peasantry which gradually 
realized that it was not damned to be ‘schismatic’”.^  ^ The result of the San Stephano Treaty and 
emergence of an excessively large Bulgarian state deteriorated the relationship between the two 
nations and led the Greek government to push the Phanar not to continue to the negotiations.
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The Bulgarians bounding to the Article 11 of the 1870 firman took plebiscite in the provinces of 
Uskub (Skopje) and Okhrid, and the result was in favor of the Bulgarian Exarchate, therefore the 
Porte gave its investiture to the Bulgarian bishops of the said provinces. The defeat of the Greek 
Patriarchate was only one phase of the plebiscites, on the other side the Serbs who had stood 
aloof the ecclesiastical crisis and following incidents around the crisis adhered to the game mostly 
thanks to the Greek designs aiming at diverting the Bulgarian attention from the region. 
Actually the Serbs were not the new guests of the conflict and owing to their lack of an effective 
instrument like Patriarchate or Exarchate, they preferred to embark upon an elaborate education 
program in Macedonia.^’
2.4.2 The Macedonian Problem as an Interstate Conflict
The struggle for Macedonia in the middle of the nineteenth century did not remain only at the 
level of ecclesiastical and educational competition. The nationalist and irredentist projects 
required the formation of some military alliances with regional and global powers. As the 
Bulgarians were seen by the Russians as a loyal nation easing the protection of Russian interests 
in the Balkans and an area near to the Turkish straits, the Greeks were supported by the 
European states, especially by the British as the key stone for the protection of the British 
interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The struggle for the seizure of an outlet to 
the Aegean between the Serbs and the Russian-supported Bulgarians led the rapprochement 
between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Serbia despite Austria’s aspirations on Bosnia 
Herzegovina. On the other hand, it was possible to run into some military alliances between the 
belligerents of the Macedonian conflict at the expense of the third one.^* But the decisive results 
for the fate of the region emerged only after the Great power engagements.
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The revolt that started in Bosnia Herzegovina in 1875 triggered a general upsurge in Bulgaria, 
so-called “April Uprising” in 1876 and eventually a Turko-Russian war in April 1877. The result 
of the fighting was unhappy for the Turks and with the San Stephano Treaty signed at the 
outskirts of Istanbul, Ottoman sovereignty on the Balkans was now over. For the Russians “since 
the seizure of Istanbul and the straits was impossible because of British opposition, they were 
bypassed on a land bridge to the Mediterranean in the form of an outstandingly inflated Bulgarian 
state”. But new posturing was considerably fragile and even posed some threat to Russian 
ambitious designs for the Balkans.Fortunately for Greece and Serbia, Great Britain and Austria 
did not allow the establishment of a grand Russian satellite in the Balkans that would probably 
constitute a bulwark against the Austria!  ^ plans for expansion southward and the British trade 
eastward.Eventually, the Congress of Berlin on July 13, 1878 amended the treaty considerably 
by leaving to Turkey Albania, Epirus, Thessalia, a part of Southern Macedonia including 
Thessaloniki, a narrow corridor between Montenegro and Serbia connecting Albania with 
Bosnia. Whereas Bulgaria was seizing the most of Turkish pre-war provinces in the Balkans even 
though the area of the planned Bulgaria in the San Stephano Treaty had comprised about 
172.500 square kilometer, now reduced into 63.700 square kilometer.^, 41
The Great powers recommended the Porte to instigate negotiations with the Greeks for 
rectification on the Greco-Turkish borders and to cede Epirus and Thessaly to the Greeks. The 
Greeks were eager to annex Thessalia to Greece proper. During the April Uprising the Greek 
societies such as Ethniki Amina and Adelfotis had organized the insurgencies in the region and 
even managed to expel the Ottoman troops and to set up some provisional governments in 
Olympus and Kastoria regions in the expectation of the arrival of the Greek army.“*^ However,
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with the cease-fire between the Ottomans and the Russians the Greeks had to put off the scheme 
for reaching up the boundaries of Macedonia until 1881.
2.4.3 The Aftermath of the Berlin Congress and Acceleration of Nationalist Propaganda
Notwithstanding the following period characterized a Balkan détente, the diplomatic maneuvers 
for Macedonia continued behind closed doors '*^ After the Berlin Congress Austria-Hungary 
entered into more cordial relations with King Milan of Serbia. The secret treaty of 1881 
permitted Serbia to extend her territories southward at the expense of the other Balkan states and 
even pledged the Austrian support when it was a case. In 1889, the treaty was renewed and 
reiterated Austria’s tolerance to a probal !e Serbian campaign along the Vardar River Austrian 
concern was sprang from the fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina over which the Serbs possessed 
historical claims was now under its own sovereignty.^ Parallel with the alteration of the methods 
to national organizations and underground activities that ranging from proselytizing and 
propaganda to terror, the Serbs came to identify overtly the whole Macedonia with the title of 
“Old Serbia” or “Young Serbia in their maps. In 1886 Serbian nationalists organized in Belgrade 
the Society of St. Sava, dedicated to the purpose of educating the Serbs living under Ottoman 
rule in the spirit of nationalism.·*^
In the Bulgarian Principality the internal and inevitably external politics were influenced mainly by 
the two political flanks; Liberals or Young Bulgarians and Conservatives. The Bulgarians 
adhered to the struggle with their new program; the so-called Act of Union that envisioned the 
liberation of Eastern Roumelie and incorporation of the Aegean coasts and Macedonia into the 
principality.·** After the leader of the liberal flank Stambolov became the most powerful political
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figure and along his seven years tenure (1887-1895), Bulgaria pursued an anti-Russian policy and 
forged warm relations with Austria and Germany.“’ Though he did not neglect Macedonia and 
supported the religious and educational program of the Exarchate and managed to attain berats 
from the Porte for the appointment of the Bulgarian priests to the vacant sees of Okhrid and 
Skopje, he refrained from supporting revolutionary elements in Macedonia and induced the 
radicals to find a new leader in his place.“* After his assassination in 1895, the Bulgarian foreign 
policy that had not allowed to fully participating in the struggle in Macedonia which gradually 
evolved into armed confrontation was altered.
On the Greek front, for the Greeks die vast areas of Macedonia was lost to the Turks and 
therefore the Eastern Question was destined to develop into a purely Macedonian question which 
the Russia-sponsored Bulgaria sought to solve at the expense of the Hellenism through 
education, religious propaganda and terrorism. According to the Greeks, the littoral Macedonia 
along the Aegean as well as that of Eastern Thrace from the River of Maritza and the Black Sea 
was entirely Greek. Similar things could be said for the western Macedonia, along the line 
running close to Manastir and Fiorina. Greek aspirations did not extend the northern and 
northeastern Macedonia.*® These lands were within the sphere of influence of Serbia and 
populated by the illiterate Slavs who had no national consciousness of any sort and open to 
Bulgarian propaganda.** Thus the Greek intellectuals responded to the Serb and the Bulgarian 
intellectuals' attempts to assimilate the localities with the help of education programs by founding 
National Society in 1894 that targeted the awakening of the Greek consciousness in the region 
for a probable fighting against the Turks. *^  Even after the decisive defeat of the Greek armies at 
the end of the Greco-Turkish War of 1897, the Greeks managed to acquire Crete. Nevertheless,
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the war had drained the military strength of Greece and now the Bulgarian activities intensified in 
the region. Therefore the Greek intellectuals formed the Committee for Macedonia to organize 
Greek Macedonians’ resistance against the Bulgarians.”  The result was the murder of a lot of 
Christian Orthodox even more than Turks.”
2.4.4 Local Uprisings in Macedonia and the VMRO
VMRO or the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization was formed on October 23, 
1893, in Thessaloniki by Dr. Gruev, the director of the Bulgarian school in Stip. Its main goal 
was to gather all discontented elements in Macedonia and area of Aegean into one entity, 
regardless of their nationality, in order to achieve a complete political autonomy for those areas.”  
In March 1895 another organization with the title of the Supreme Macedonian Committee was 
set up in Bulgaria by the Macedonian associations which had already been formed by the 
Bulgarian émigrés from Macedonia after the San Stephano Treaty. With the establishment of 
VMRO”  and the Bulgarian support to the organization, the inhabitants of the area were left in 
between the two fires, the revolutionaries and the Ottoman forces that was composed of 
irregulars rather than clumsy military troops. The adherence of the Serbs and the Greeks, and 
furthermore their adoption of the same tactics with VMRO deteriorated the situation. The 
civilians, poor peasantry were the most suffered from the bandits frequently changing their side as 
subject to the propaganda of the ardently nationalist priests or their will to plunder even their
57own ethnic and religious brethren.
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The Internal Organization did not aim the annexation of Macedonia to Bulgaria and called all the 
nationalities for a general uprising against the Ottoman rule whereas the External Organization 
aimed at the annexation of the region by Bulgaria. In Macedonia the organization was headed by 
Gotse Delchev (1872-1903). In 1896, along with G. Petrov, he assumed the task of organizing 
the administrative apparatus of VMRO. They divided the Macedonian region into seven regions, 
each with regional structure and a central committee in Thessaloniki as the supreme organ.’* 
Having encouraged from the Greek gains despite their humiliation in 1896 Delchev and his 
companions decided to initiate a revolt against the Porte expecting Great Powers’ aid was 
forthcoming. However the financial problems pushed the revolutionaries to adopt the methods of 
brigandage, thereby alienating the population to their causes .The  VMRO strategies recalling 
the khaiduti methods of the past created a terrible anarchy in the areas mostly populated by 
Muslims. On the other hand, the activities of VMRO pushed the Greeks and Serbs to come 
closer against the Bulgarian plots in the region. This situation was excessively jeopardized the 
interest of the Bulgarians in that neither VMRO nor Bulgarian military force had the capability to 
resist an united hostile Balkan block. Thus, within the organization the notion that establishment 
of a Balkan Federation which Macedonia would Join as a full-fledged member began to attract 
many and subsequently a federalist segment became highly vocal, and its view found support 
among the ranks of the Marxists and Agrarians, strengthening rivals of nationalists in Bulgaria.^60
VMRO played a pivotal role in the instigation of the biggest uprising the region had ever seen. 
The revolt started on 2-3 August 1903 in Bitola and quickly spread, albeit the local population 
did not support it as wholeheartedly as the insurgencies had hoped. The other disappointing point 
for the insurgents was that the great powers sought to preserve the status quo in the face of
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escalating crisis and Bulgarian ineptitude to force the Porte to step back.®* The quick collapse of 
the revolt was a clear sign to the failure of decision to start the movement as soon as possible and 
the defeat caused further fragmentation in the organization’s rank-and-file.®  ^ Following Young 
Turk Revolution initially encouraged the organization leadership, but nationalistic façade of the 
new administration in Istanbul extinguished the expectations®  ^and the 10 resumed its activities.
2.5 Macedonian Problem During the Regional and Global Wars
Although particularly for the Bulgarians, a Balkan Alliance seemed too remote to be materialized 
in the beginning of the twentieth century,®'* the Failure of the Ilinden Uprising shifted the foreign 
policy priorities of Sofia. After the 1908 Young Turk Revolution in Turkey, King Ferdinand of 
Bulgaria declared his state’s formal independence and from this date onwards Bulgaria took the 
lead in the negotiations that was to result in the formation of a Balkan League.®® Now Turkey 
plagued by Turko-Italian War of 1911 was more open to a blow from the Balkan powers.
2.5.1 Balkan Wars and World War I
The formation of a Balkan Lei. '»ue against The Ottoman Empire began to take shape with the 
conclusion of a Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty in March 1912. A secret annex contained the provisions 
entailing, the partition of Macedonia as well as the Russian Emperor’s arbitration, should a 
disagreement arise between the parties. Bulgarians consecutively materialized a Bulgarian-Greek 
alliance in May 1912, albeit they failed to reach a compromise on the partition of the lands to be 
liberated from the Ottoman Empire particularly in Macedonia.®®. Montenegro did not sign an
20
alliance agreement and its consent was received orally in August or September 1912.®^  Serbia 
recognized Bulgarian ascendancy to south of a line stretching from just north of Kriva Palanka 
near Okhnd. The territory north of this line- including Struga, Debar, Kicevo, Gostivar, Tetovo, 
Skopje and Kumanovo- was to be subject to the arbitration of the Russian Tsar. The conquered 
territories would be put under common dominion- condominium.** At the end of the war, a new 
armistice was declared on 26 March 1913, and after the signature of the Treaty of London on 30 
May 1913, the Ottomans lost all their lands in the Balkans, except Istanbul, and its environs.*^
After the triumph, new disagreements aroused among the allies. Firstly despite they had to 
shoulder much of the burden of the fighting and casualties in Thrace, the Bulgarians could not 
materialize their aspirations regarding Macedonia. Besides, one of the most important handicaps 
of the alliance was its omittence of the Albanians' right to independence.’® Now the Great 
Powers, primarily Austria-Hungary and Italy insisted on the formation of an Albanian state, 
thereby pushing Serbia to demand compensation in Macedonia for its losses in the west. The time 
was ripe also for Romania and this state demanded Dobrudja from Bulgaria as the prize of its 
neutrality during the war.”  The war erupted following the low-level skirmishes along the line 
separating Serbian troops from the Bulgarians’ on June 30, 1913. Romania and Turkey soon 
joined Serbia and Greece in a counterattack on Bulgaria. By the July 31, 1913 Armistice the 
Ottomans seized Edime, the Romanians occupied Dobrudza and Macedonia was partitioned 
between the Serbs and the Greeks.
The Treaty of Bucharest in August 1913 carved up Macedonia into three pieces, the smallest of 
which -the so-called Pirin Macedonia- was given to Bulgaria limited with Strumica Valley, Serbia
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took the Vardar Valley with Skopje, Bitola and Okhrid, and Greece acquired southern 
Macedonia including Thessaloniki, Kavala, Seres, and parts of Epirus. In Thrace Bulgaria 
received the coastline stretching from Macedonia and Mesta Rivers.’  ^ The fighting during the 
first Balkan Wars had caused a crowded emigration movement from the region to the United 
States and as subject to their allegiance of the émigrés, to Turkey and Bulgaria. The Second 
Balkan War led about 15.000 Bulgarian of Macedonia to follow the Bulgarian armies in retreat.’  ^
These Bulgarian émigrés were to play a significant role within the post-war Bulgarian politics.
During the negotiations following the Balkan Wars the Bulgarian side had asked the annexation 
of a clause to the treaty entailing the guarantees to the autonomous status of religious 
committees and freedom to the schools in the occupied territories in that lack of such a guarantee 
made the Exarchate activities in the region impossible, but they failed. Bulgaria had to curb all its 
links with the region.’“* This was an unacceptable thing for the Bulgarians; “the matter was which 
side was willing and would ultimately be able to deliver Macedonia to Bulgaria.’* That was the 
reason why the Bulgarians joined the Word War I beside the rivals of the Entente which did 
guarantee what Sofia aspired. In 1915 the Bulgarian armies occupied Vardar and Aegean 
Macedonia. While the Slavs who defined themselves akin to Bulgarians greeted the coming army, 
the Bulgarians did not approach the others leniently; both the Greeks and Serbs were persecuted 
and Patriarchists were the pitiest victims of the Bulgarian repression campaign.’*^
After the First world War Macedonia was divided among the neighboring Balkan states. Of its 
approximately 26.150 square miles, about half (13.300 square miles) went to Greece. Yugoslavia 
gained nearly as much as Greece’s portion (10.000 square miles) whereas Bulgaria had to satisfy
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with a small area (2. 600 square miles), lastly Albania annexed a tiny strip along its eastern 
border. Beside the decisive defeat at the battle fields, the Bulgarians now had to shoulder the 
heavy burden of thousands of refugees fled before the victorious Entente armies. By 1934 
Macedonian and Thracian refiigees accounted for more than 10 percent of Sofia’s population’  ^
and Macedonian activists now possessed an outstanding leverage card in Bulgarian politics.
2.5.2 Macedonian Question in Inter-War Period
In Bulgaria, after the fled of King Ferdinand who was charged with the responsibility of the 
humiliation, Stambolisky’s party, the Bulgarian Agrarian National Party (BANU) garnered the 
most of the votes of the first post-War elections in 1919. In the opposition the socialist block 
segmented into two camps in 1903; broad socialists who advocated a West-European type of 
social democracy and narrow socialists, namely the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), who 
adopted a more aggressive stance towards the Macedonian question.’* The BCP policies 
bounding to the precepts of Communism envisaged the foundation of a Socialist Balkan 
Federation in which an autonomous Macedonia should take its place. Vlasidis holds that the 
espousal of the BCP for an autonomous Macedonia was heavily colored by nationalistic 
sentiments once the party leadership perceived the Slav-speaking inhabitants of the region as 
Bulgarians and intended to rescue those ethnic brethren.’  ^However, this dilemma forced them to 
make a choice between the Comintern and nationalist schemes and led to their destruction. At 
the end of 1918, VMRO reestablished itself in Sofia, in the political stronghold of the 
Macedonian refugees.** VMRO regarded autonomy as only a fair solution for the Bulgarian 
population remained in Yugoslavia and Greece. The chosen tactic, therefore, to accomplish this
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purpose was to arouse the interests of the Great Powers and international community by stressing 
that those living in Macedonian region were neither Yugoslav nor Greek but a distinct entity in 
its own right. Beside, its rhetoric thereof to exert influence over particularly the Westerners, 
VMRO, thanks to its sustained man power, material resources and immunity, began to launch 
terrorist incursions particularly into the Yugoslav territories and terrorize the population living 
here.*^
With the intensification of the VMRO attacks targeting mostly Vardar Macedonia, tension 
between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria went up again. VMRO activities were inflicting damage not 
only on the projects of Stambolisky*'* but also on the interests of the British and the French who 
sought to prevent the penetration of fascist Italy and Germany into the Balkans easily. With the 
mediation of the League of Nation which was overtly dominated by France and the Great Britain, 
supporting a Balkan block idea against Germany, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia entered into 
negotiations which was to result in signature of the Niche Convention in May 1923 .** However 
VMRO found an important ally in the Military League. The developments led the League 
leadership to do something more and they managed to oust Stambolisky government in June 
1923 with the help of VMRO forces that were waiting to act if its help was needed.** Naturally 
VMRO attacks were resumed and persisted under the scrutiny of the new leader Tsankov and his 
successor Liapchev.*’ However the constant VMRO terrorism along with the problems that the 
refugees from Macedonia created, alienated the population to the cause of VMRO. Hence, the 
challenging opinions led to an internal split of the organization. After the assassination of 
Stambolisky some outstanding members of VMRO thought that the Macedonian question could 
be solved by bounding to the socialist ideals. But this socialist clique within the organization was
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annihilated and Mihailov who was more ambitious nationalist and supported by Italy handled the 
reign of the organization.**
The Soviets, assessing potentialities of the region for a communist uprising could not permit 
slipping such an organization off their hands. After the yield of VMRO leadership who came 
closer to the Comintern’s policies in the face of gigantic pressures from the Bulgarian War 
Committee in Sofia and from ultranationalists within VMRO, the Soviets adopted a new policy 
based on the pro-Communist faction of VMRO and endorsed Dimitar Vlahov to form VMRO- 
United (VMRO-ob).*’ This organization advocated an autonomous Macedonia within a 
Federation of Balkan Socialist Republics, but due to its communist character, had never been a 
serious rival to VMRO.^®
In 1926 when Andrey Liapchev, a Macedonian, came to power and the Bulgarian government 
increased its support to VMRO. The rising terrorist activities of the organization caused 
international reactions as well as political groupings like ‘the Zveno’ (Link) that opposed the 
organization’s provocative acts.^’ With the foundation of the Balkan Pact in February 1934, - a 
defense pact that was overtly directed toward Bulgaria - the concerns of the opposition grew and 
sparked a bloodless coup d’etat in the hands of the members of the Zveno and the Military 
League led by Damien Velchev on May 19, 1934.^  ^Nevertheless, the Germans wished Bulgaria 
not to adhere to the Balkan Block which was appeared overtly against him. Thus the new 
government could not survive and the King Boris launched a counter-coup and managed to 
topple the interveners. Under the reign of Boris, Bulgaria opted for Germany and mutilated 
fascist applications of the German Führer.
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2.5.3 The Second World War Period
Initially Hitler chosen to stay aloof of the Balkan affairs, and Germany’s policy toward the region 
remained as such until 1941 summer. When in June 1940 Russia demanded from Romania the 
cessation of Besarabia, the Bulgarians lost no time and with the mediation of Hitler and Mussolini 
Romania yielded and ceded Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria in December 1940. The remaining 
destination of the Bulgarian foreign policy now was Macedonia. During the Second World War 
II the fate of the Balkans was determined decisively by the developments around the Greco- 
British rapprochement in the face of growing possibility of Bulgaro-German axis. At the 
beginning of the war the British priorities were given to the neutrality of Italy and insulation of 
the war from the Mediterranean. Although the Italian assault from Albania to Greece changed the 
course of events, the successful resistance and following counter-offensive of the Greeks 
persuaded the British to transform their defensive policies into an offensive, now that they came 
to realize that this country could constitute an excellent base for a southern front against the
Germans.95
Despite all painstaking approach of Greece to Germany^® upon the appearance of a Greece-based 
British air raid against the Romanian oil fields. Hitler decided to march his armies southward 
before embarking upon his Barbarossa campaign.^^ On November 17, 1940 Hitler attained the 
consent of King Boris for the free passing of the German troops through the Bulgarian soil and 
cemented this collaboration by signing the Tripartite Pact with Bulgaria on March 1, 1941. 
Although Bulgarian armies should not contact the Greek armies, Bulgaria, in return for its help, 
should acquire Western Thrace, the territories between the estuaries of Maritsa and Struma
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Rivers after the defeat of the Greeks.^* During the Balkan campaign, toppling of a pro-German 
government in Yugoslavia was an unexpected development,and it irked Hitler and induced 
him to settle the Macedonian problem by giving whole region to the Bulgarians.
The Bulgarian troops were greeted by the Slavic population in Vardar Macedonia albeit not 
wholeheartedly as in Vardar, in Aegean Macedonia. As it was in the past, Bulgaria started a new 
bulgarianization campaign first through the establishment of schools -more than 800- and a 
university in Skopje. However the enthusiasm shown to the Bulgarian troops gradually 
extinguished, now that the newcomers began to behave toward the localities as if they were the 
conquerors seized a foreign land. In March 1942 the central government in Sofia set up an 
absolute control over the territories. Nevertheless the bad working Bulgarian bureaucracy 
embroiled in corruption alienated more the local people to itself Beside the iron-fist governance 
of Sofia, the influx of the Bulgarian Orthodox priests who adopted same arrogant attitude toward 
the people heightened the resentment along with demand for autonomy among the Slav-speaking 
people.'®'
On the other hand, the occupation of Yugoslav Macedonia led to the outbreak of a bitter struggle 
between the Yugoslav and the Bulgarian communist parties that collaborated with the Bulgarian 
forces. Since the Bulgarian communists were both reluctant and impotent to assault the Bulgarian 
troops, Yugoslav partisans took the lead.'®  ^The dissent felt toward the Bulgarian troops among 
the localities increased to an extent that Tito thought that the time had come to conceive the 
people of the region to the idea of a united Macedonia within a socialist Yugoslav Federation. He 
also managed to convince the Greek communists to the formation of a Slav National Liberation
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Front (SNOF).^®  ^Moreover the 1941 Jajce Declaration reflected the intentions of the Yugoslav 
communists to establish an independent Macedonian state within the Yugoslav state to be 
founded.
2.6 AVNOJ and the Declaration of an Independent Macedonia Within Yugoslavia
Tito and his National Liberation Army was recognized and supported by the West by the end of 
1943; and within this period the ideals of Tito found their supporters even among non-communist 
elements fighting Germans. “Brotherhood and Unity” was the official credo of the movement. 
Yet the step that should determine the fate of the peoples particularly living in Yugoslavia was to 
be taken at Jajce at the end of the November 1943. The historical Second Session of the Anti- 
Fascist Council of the Communist Liberation Movement (AVNOJ) and the nucleus of the future 
socialist government of Yugoslavia, affirmed the existence of a Macedonian nation which in 
future, would posses equal rights with the other nations of the Yugoslav Federation. In the same 
vein, on August 2, 1944 the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation of Macedonia declared 
the establishment of the People’s Republic of Macedonia which joined the ranks of the other five
federal units. 105
The second leg of the Tito politics to settle the Macedonian problem was the incorporation of 
Bulgaria into newly founded federal state. The development of the Macedonian problem in 
1941 had left Moscow in between. Bulgarian communists had continued to claim their 
jurisdiction over the revolutionary activities in Yugoslav Macedonia since they had always 
assumed that the territories belonged to Bulgaria. Moreover Tito’s policies by the end of the
28
war and appearance of allegedly authentic Macedonian nation complicated the situation. In the 
face of sensitivity of the circumstances, the Soviets opted for the policies of Tito because his 
organization was indisputably most successful ally to the Soviet cause in the Balkans. Therefore 
the Soviets backed the designs of Tito envisaging initially formation of a Federal Yugoslavia in 
which a united Macedonia should take its place and eventually expand so as to contain Albania, 
Bulgaria and Greece.*®* For the leadership of Fatherland Front and Gorgi Dimitrov, the program 
of a national consciousness, as the Yugoslav leadership envisaged, could put an end to the status 
of Macedonia as the “apple of discord”.*®® But there were certain problems. Bulgaria was not 
prepared to play second fiddle to Tito’s Yugoslavia yet; therefore, it made it clear that it could 
not agree to the Yugoslav Federation plans on the conditions other than Yugoslav-Bulgarian 
parity.**® With the objections of the great powers*** Bulgaria and Yugoslavia froze their projects 
until the agreement at Bled in August 1947 in which the parties envisioned solution of the 
Macedonian problem through a federative structure and cultural rapprochement.**^
Meanwhile the Yugoslav government had intensified its verbal attacks on the pro-Western Greek 
government for its harsh persecution of the ethnic Slavs. At the Paris Conference on September 
6, 1946 Yugoslavia called for the unification of Macedonia, thereby disturbing the Greek 
government and its Western allies.**^  The situation deteriorated with Greece plunging into a 
bitter civil war. Now that the Germans were defeated, the Greek Communist Party along with 
the National Liberation Front (NOF) -former SNOF - embarked upon a wide guerrilla movement 
to topple the pro-West Greek government and to form a People’s Republic in Greece upon the 
directives of the Cominform -former Comintern- and Stalin.**“* Although the Titoist flank in the 
ranks of the Greek communists was neutralized by those who felt allergy to the Macedonian
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issue,"’ Tito did not relinquish his plans that aimed to secure an outlet to the Aegean."® Greek 
communist guerrillas even seized the control of Aegean Macedonia including Thessaloniki until 
their defeat and signature of the Varkiza Agreement in February 1945. However, in contrast with 
the expectations of Tito, they did not demand the integration of Aegean Macedonia with 
Yugoslav Macedonia but recognition of a separate Macedonian nation akin to the those living in 
Vardar and Pirin Macedonia."’
2.6.1 Tito-Stalin Feud and the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Increasing power of Tito in Balkan politics raised the suspicions of the Soviet leadership. Stalin 
was opposed to the fellow regimes acting independently from Cominform and his stand led to a 
serious debacle between Belgrade and Moscow. Prior to the World War II, various Balkan 
communist parties had enjoyed a limited popular support, and under the scrutiny of the 
Comintern ideologies, their approach to the Macedonian question had envisaged a “united and 
independent Macedonia”. This line had supported enthusiastically by the Bulgarian communists, 
in contrast to the Greek and Yugoslav communists who had been fearful of criticism that might 
be raised among the nationalist camps."* However, between 1933-1935 Comintern had changed 
its stance toward the issue and adopted the thesis of Yugoslav communists, assuming that the 
Macedonian Slavs were neither Serb nor Bulgarian but a separate and authentic entity, 
Macedonian nation, mostly owing to its designs for the formation of a united communist front 
against advancing fascist forces. To be sure, the new approach of the Comintern was to be to the 
disappointment of the Bulgarian Communist Party. When Tito and Stalin became embroiled 
into a flagrant polemic on the scrutiny of the Cominform over all the communist parties including
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that of Yugoslavia in 1948, Stalin returned to the post-1933 thesis of the Comintern once again 
to overthrow this mutiny organization with the help of the Macedonian-Slavs who felt themselves 
closer to the Bulgarians. All the developments indicated to what extend the matter served the 
interests of states in Balkan power politics.
The split between Tito and Stalin brought about some practical outcomes for the Bulgarian 
designs on Macedonia. First of all, the feud furnished needed pretext for Sofia to renege the 
commitments which were formerly made by Dimitrov on the Pirin Macedonia and provided 
Bulgarians with the tolerance and support of the Soviets to regain Vardar Macedonia. On the 
other hand, the Bulgaro-Yugoslav conflict increased the defection from Vardar for Bulgaria and 
Skopje authorities had to resort to considerable repression to control pro-Bulgarian 
population.’^ ' Following the expulsion of Tito from Cominform, the revival of former Comintern 
plan that had envisaged an independent Macedonian state came on to the a g e n d a . T h e  
Bulgarians supported wholeheartedly the Stalinist front in that they could annex the Yugoslav 
portion of Macedonia to Bulgaria. Therefore, from the outset the constitution of the post-war 
Yugoslavia was carefully worded in such a way as to indicate that each nation of Yugoslavia had 
the right to self determination, including the right of secession, but on the other hand, that once 
during the Second World War those nations had united on the basis of their freely expressed will, 
they had made their decision that should bind them forever, and that the right of secession should 
no longer be ap p l i ed . In  other words, Macedonia should remain within Yugoslavia.
At this stage Tito seemed to have believed genuinely that the new socialist state was still in the 
process of being created, so that the federalist arrangements were compulsory albeit in the long
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range just ephemeral formality. The federalism was required for the accomplishment of national 
homogeneity, but on the other hand, the process of national homogenization itself would perhaps 
erode the basis for federal system. Over time the national differences would wither away thereby 
rendering federalism or even state itself unnecessary.*^^ On the other hand, Tito was anxious to 
construct some barriers to the Serbs who were the most numerous and widespread ethnic group 
always tended to dominate political agenda. Thus the project came into operation with the 
formation of autonomous provinces of Kosovo/a and Vojvodina along with the declaration of 
Bosnia Herzegovina as a state, a traditional apple of discord between the Croats and the Serbs. In 
similar fahion, Macedonization of the former Vardarska Banovina of the Yugoslav Kingdom, 
which even the Yugoslav communists in 1923 recognized as Serbian soil,*^  ^was another blow to 
the Serbian preponderance.
In addition, by recognizing the existence of a separate Macedonian nation, the Communist Party 
of Yugoslavia was able to gain the control of Vardar Macedonia. Tito’s policy was simply the
retention of Yugoslav Macedonia and pursuit of a new enlarged Macedonia. The former 
represented his minimum and short-term, and the other his maximum and long-term goals. One 
thing was clear; “if there were to be a Greater Macedonia it was to be based on the Yugoslav 
Macedonia, not on either parts of Macedonia.”*^* To materialize this aim, Belgrade wanted the 
socialist leaders of Macedonia “to place their loyalties above their regional chauvinism and 
persuade the people to their nationality’s au then t ic i t y . I n  order to accomplish this, it was 
necessary to eliminate the sense of Bulgarian identity shared by many inhabitants of the area, 
because according to the principle of self determination, the inhabitants of Vardar Macedonia 
were Bulgarians, then the land inhabited should be part of Bulgaria. Tito was aware that the
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Bulgarians would never cease to claim this part of Yugoslavia, as its population was 
overwhelmingly akin to the Bulgarians.*^* Since this was clearly not in the interest of Yugoslavia 
the Slavs of Macedonia must have been, as neither Serbs nor Bulgarian, but something else- 
Macedonians. *^^
2.6.2 Macedonian Nation-Building During the Yugoslav Era
Smith advocates that nationalist ideologies are based on the assumption of the existence of 
geographically and culturally unique nation which is believed to be bom of indissolubly linked to 
a bounded territory and a particular histoiy. The goal of nationalist movement is to turn the 
ethnic group into that more abstract and politicized category, nation, and then to establish the 
latter as the sole criterion of the statehood. *^  ^ What Smith had defined was realized by obvious 
help or the elaborate plans of the Yugoslav Communist Party and through the local communist 
leadership of Macedonia and within the framework of socialist ideology which envisioned the 
right of self determination of peoples.*^“* The construction of a Macedonian nation proved the 
assertion that it was not nations that make states, but states that make nations. *^  ^ The chief 
reason of Tito’s success in Macedonia was inherited in the fact that he realized a Macedonian 
nation did exist, and that it had the right to statehood. The exiled Yugoslav government was 
unable to rid itself of rigid Serbianizm. The Bulgarians exhausted their reservoir of goodwill 
through narrow-minded Bulgarian chauvinism. The Western powers mostly ignored the 
Macedonian problem. *^  ^ What urged those peoples to consider themselves as a separate entity 
from the Serbs or Bulgarians was the fact that they had suffered collectively from the suppression 
policies in the hands of both the Serbs and the Bulgarians.*^’
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The emergence of a Macedonia was actually contrasted with the implementation of socialist 
precepts in the Yugoslav state. The establishment of an autonomous Macedonian Orthodox 
Church in 1958 was both the response to the Bulgarian campaign to deny the existence of a 
Macedonian nation and language and was, with the words of Geertz, ‘a successful integration of 
primordial attachments with civil politics’.*^® Ironically the establishment of a Macedonian 
Church clearly violated the principle that in Yugoslavia no religious organizations should be 
allowed to form alliance with a particular nationality group. Thus it was clear that the 
Macedonian Church served another goal.*^  ^Besides it, the decision of the Yugoslav communists 
to grant Macedonia a significant degree of autonomy in the cultural sphere gave impetus to the 
development of a Macedonian national identity. The establishment of standard literary 
Macedonian as the official language of the Republic of Macedonia in 1944 was a major 
contribution to the construction of a distinct Macedonian nationality. It was also regarded by the 
Yugoslav governments as an important bulwark against Bulgarian irredentism”.*'*®
In the Yugoslav period the most important steps in the direction of nation-building was the 
creation of a Macedonian theater and the opening of research and educational organizations such 
as “the Scientific Institute for the National History of the Macedonian People” and the 
“Macedonian University” in Skopje in December 1948. One of the primary objectives of the 
Institute for National History and University of Skopje was the study of Macedonian history. The 
official version of the Institute for the National History on Macedonian history was published in 
three volumes. In this history the Macedonian experts embarked upon correcting or rewriting 
some historical events. During much of the Cold War, while the Greeks assumed it as just the 
name of geographical entity the Bulgarians refrained from provoking the Yugoslavs just at the
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time when their patrons, the Soviets, were trying to repair the damages on relations that former 
Stalinist policies had inflicted. A new conflict on the region with its international resonance had 
to wait an independent Macedonia’s ascending the Balkan stage.
2.7 The Independence of the Republic of Macedonia
Postwar Yugoslavia was a highly centralized system in the early years following the Second 
World War. The stages of the Yugoslavization policies seemed to have been successful to many 
Westerners, now that Yugoslavia opened itself increasingly to the Western world. On the other 
hand the boiling ethnic tensions behind the mask of Yugoslavism had distinguished itself even 
before the death of Tito. The tensions, arising following the death of the founding father of 
Yugoslavia escalated into an inter-ethnic conflict thereby posing that all the efforts to erode the 
basis of ethnic strains have been ephemeral. The 1974 Constitution promulgated a more pluralist 
and decentralized administration which actually accelarated the disintegration of Yugoslavia’“*^ 
because from this time onward republican units began to undermine the Yugoslav state itself 
which had been assumed as the most influential instrument in the hands of Serbian chauvinism. In 
this, the unstable economic course played a pivotal role; the Croats and Slovenes thought that 
they had been milked by the other underdeveloped nations of Yugoslavia and all their prosperity 
had been drained for the sake of the co-ownership of the economic resources of Yugoslav 
people.
“Yugoslavia’s economic and political deterioration during the 1980s spawned a cottage industry 
of domestic commentators who offered various explanations for the country’s crisis and
35
suggested a variety of strategies for putting things right”- the field was termed by some 
Yugoslavs as ‘crisisology’ .*'*^ Briefly the models offered for a durable solution to the ongoing 
problems of Yugoslavia can be clustered around three major contending reform strategies; put 
forth by the Serbs, Slovene and Croats and lastly those who left in between. Macedonian 
leadership was among those who was left in between. Macedonian communists under the 
leadership of Vasil Tupurkovksi supported Milosevic, in that they believed that any concession 
made by the communist regime to other political movements within the aura of pluralism might 
cause the undermining of the system itself Thus Macedonian leadership advocated a moderate 
notion on the basis that “the party -the League of Communist- must rid itself of the monopoly of 
power, but in such a way that it does not lose its safeguard position and find itself on the margins
of social processes. 145
In December 1990 voters in Macedonia went to the polls in the first round of competitive 
electoral process. Before the elections the pluralistic aura had permitted the emergence of over 
twenty parties, most of which were committed to various ethnopolitical goals. The two important 
parties endorsing a nationalistic platform were the Movement for Pan-Macedonian Action 
(MAAK) and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for 
Macedonian National Unity (V. TRO-DPMNE). Along with the Slav Macedonian parties, the 
most important component of the whole Macedonian population Albanians set up their party, the 
Party for Democratic Prosperity for Macedonia (PDPM).
The MAAK adopted a respectively moderate anti-Communist and nationalistic rhetoric and 
advocated a “spiritual union of all Macedonians” in a sovereign Macedonian state that would be
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affiliated with a confederaly organized Yugoslavia but no longer subject to “Serbian 
hegemonism”.*'*^  On the other hand, the VMRO-DPMNE, a new party founded mostly by those 
defected from the MAAK for its moderate stance toward the Macedonian cause, posed a more 
irritating look to the outsiders in June 1990. Led by LJupca Georgievski, it assured they should 
follow the main ideals of the Ilinden Uprising of 1903, including unification of all Macedonians 
scattered in the neighboring countries. Even if the main goal was mentioned one, the strategists 
of the party saw the advocating of a Macedonian state that would take place within a confederal 
Yugoslav state an initial and logical step. These two parties that shared the same views on the 
growing Albanian political influence, decided to form an electoral coalition together with three 
smaller parties, known as the All-Macedonian National Front.
Despite their programmatic differences all the major parties tended toward the sovereignty of the 
Macedonian state and at least temporary association with the other parts of the disintegrated 
Yugoslavia. On the other hand. Premier Markovic's opinions on transition to market-oriented 
economy and closer ties with Western Europe found a considerable number of supporter among 
the rank-and-file of all the parties. Another problematic phase of the projects for an independent 
Macedonian state was the past experience of the Macedonians in the hands of the neighboring 
hegemonic states. Therefore the leaders of the political parties were sensitive to the clarification 
of the future status of Macedonian state within a newly formed Yugoslavia, and naturally 
sovereignty was obviously implying the preservation of the fragile identity of the Macedonian
nation. 148
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The outcome of the general elections of Macedonia indicated that the fate of the country was to 
depend upon the fragile arithmetic equilibrium between the contending blocks of the political 
parties in the a s semb ly .On  the other hand, there existed some developments, hinting at the 
rising nationalist feelings among the Macedonian elite parallel with the other peoples of Slovenia 
, Croatia and Serbia. The course of events proved that the Macedonians could not escape the 
wildfire of nationalism engulfed Yugoslavia by the end of the 1980s. Macedonian nationalism 
came to destroy the inter-ethnic harmony in the republic and destabilize it politically.
On May 17, 1989, the Macedonian Assembly adopted an amendment rewriting the Article 1 of 
the Constitution of Macedonia. In its new version the article proclaimed Macedonia as “the 
national state of Macedonian people” dropping its reference to the other ethnicities living in 
Macedonia.*’® In January 1991 the Macedonian National Assembly (Sobranie) declared 
sovereignty within Yugoslavia and elected Kiro Gligorov as the first president of the republic. 
The election of a moderate figure such as Kiro Gligorov, an experienced communist, as the 
president of the republic played a significant role in the amelioration of both internal and external 
ethnic fnction to a given extent.*’* Until the rounds, the Macedonian leadership had tended to 
support the federal presidency’s views in contrast to the Slovenes and Croats who endorsed 
national sovereignty and loose confederation. However, as the republican elections approached, 
the confederal option gained popularity among the governing cadre. *’  ^ During the debacle the 
Macedonians along with the Bosnian leadership pursued a middle way and adopted a respectively 
more flexible stance, favoring the idea combining the aspects of both federalism and 
confederalism. But their attempts were ephemeral and*’  ^ on June 25, 1991 -a day before the 
deadline- first Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence from Yugoslavia. The JNA
38
responded by marching over the Slovenes through the Croatian territory. Serbo-Croatian 
confrontation was a turning point for the Macedonian leadership. Now that Serbia exposed its 
aggressive façade, the Macedonians tended to believe that their position as a small country would 
be more difficult than in a rogue Yugoslavia dominated by Serbia under the reign of Milosevic.
The Macedonian Assembly handled the issue of Macedonian secession on June 26, 1991. During 
the sessions the most enthusiastic support for an immediate proclamation of independence came 
from the VMRO-DPMNE but upon the painstaking approach of the deputies of other parties the 
Assembly adopted a “wait and see” strategy. But by mid-July the escalation of the skirmishes 
between the Serbian irregulars and the Croatian defense units gradually altered the stance of the 
Sobranie.'”  On July 6 the Macedonian Assembly decided that “if no agreement can be reached in 
a proposal and democratic way on a union of sovereign states on Yugoslav territory, the 
government must put before the assembly a constitutional law whereby the Republic of 
Macedonia, as an independent and sovereign and independent state, will assume and carry out its
sovereign rights 156
The Macedonians who saw the attempts less than full recognition-protectorates, safe havens and 
territories, that were put into practice in Croatia were destined for an ultimate failure, regarded 
statehood as the only viable political option.*”  On the other hand, it is obvious that the decision 
for declaration of independence was taken for fear that Macedonia would eventually be annexed 
by Serbia.*^* The Macedonian leadership was in a sense encouraged by the European capitals, 
which, in the days following collapse of the communism in Europe and amidst the new euphoria 
and expectations of democracy and freedom, assumed that the appropriate principle that needed
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to be applied to the former communist countries of Europe was the principle of national self- 
determination and not the territorial integrity of the state.
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CHAPTER HI: INDEPENDENCE OF MACEDONIA AND THE ENSUING CRISIS
With the independence the Republic of Macedonia external sources of a potential conflict 
increased; first the Greek-Macedonian dispute on the name of the republic, second the conflictual 
relations with other neighbors, namely Serbia, Bulgaria and Albania. All the aforementioned 
factors have been the factors affecting negatively or positively the future of this fledgling state, in 
the context of the relationship with international organizations like UN, EU, OSCE, NATO 
global great powers as well as powerful states that in the past had seen the region within their 
own sphere of influence like Germany, Turkey, Russia and Italy. In the past the claims of the 
contending belligerents had been based on three principles; the usable past and historical 
precedents; the ethnic composition or national consciousness of the people; and the importance 
of maintaining a balance of power.' The protagonists of the current conflict had already used 
excessively self-glorification and myth-making as moral and legal basis to formulate their foreign 
policies. The recent developments following the independence of Macedonia have indicated that 
the nationalism is still a contributing factor for this protracted struggle.
3.1 Recognition Crisis with Greece
Macedonia’s relations with Greece as well as those of Tito's Yugoslavia had been rocky since the 
end of the Second World War. But the Cold War that continued to overshadow global politics 
until late 1980s urged the Greeks and Yugoslavs to adopt a more painstaking policy toward each 
other although Macedonia remained a sore spot between the two. Nevertheless, as long as 
Belgrade was in the control of Macedonia, the problem lost its explosive character; “during the
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period the Macedonian question was part of a Yugoslav strategy of internal politics and the rare 
outbursts belonged to tactical arsenal of diplomatic pressures towards Greece and Bulgaria”.^  
During the Cold War the US supported Yugoslavia and pushed the Greek governments not to 
provoke the Yugoslav leadership by assaulting for its Macedonization policies in which it used 
frequently the symbols that the Greeks deemed as belonged to themselves. The impact of this 
struggle could be felt only abroad.^ With Tito’s death and Papandreou’s coming to power in 
Greece, the relationship between the two Balkan states began to sour once again. The 
independence of Macedonia carried the situation to more perilous platforms and the newly 
independent republic of Yugoslavia plunged into a flammable debate with Greece that resulted in 
the isolation of the fledgling state in international arena in legal terms.
3.1.1 Greek Objections to Macedonia's Independence
Greek nationalist ideology has refused consisently to concede on three main issues; the existence 
of a Macedonian nation; a Macedonian language and a Macedonian minority in Greece.^ 
Therefore, the Greek researchers have generally used the term “Slav-speakers” or “Slavophones” 
when they imply the Slavic population living in Macedonia along the Yugoslavia period.^ 
According to the Greek nationalists, the Macedonian nation is a “false” or “forged” nation. “It is 
an artificial creation, fabrication or invention of Tito, who in 1944 “baptized” a mosaic of 
nationalities, i.e., Albanians, Serbs, Turks, Greeks, Vlachs, Gypsies, and without justification at 
all gave them the name Macedonians. A nation was created by a government decree”.’ The 
Macedonians angrily respond to the allegations of the Greek side by saying that they are Slav and 
close to Bulgarians, and that, by saying all of this claims aim at dividing the Macedonian nation.
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which has already been divided among the three states anyway. While the Greeks argue that 
Macedonian can not be used in ethnic or national sense, Macedonians claim that it certainly can. 
For the Macedonians confirming the existence of an authentic Macedonian nation and language 
carries vital importance because of the existence of the Bulgarian, Albanian and Greek minority 
within the boundaries of the state. Therefore, they try to prove that the Macedonian language has 
a history and lineage dating back to a millennium even though that was created through the 
official means at the disposal of the Yugoslav state in 1944.*
From the Greek nationalist perspective there are three contentious points;^ with the use of the 
name and the symbol of Macedonia, Sun of Vergina in their flags and the tower of Thessaloniki 
on their currencies, Macedonians both steal the Greek national property and make irredentist 
claims to Greek territory. As the evidence to the Macedonian territorial claims against Greece 
the Greek governments regularly cited several passages in the Macedonian constitution. The 
preamble of the Macedonian constitution linked the recent establishment of a sovereign 
Macedonian state with the creation of the People’s Republic of Macedonia on August 2, 1944. 
The preamble specifically stated that the resolution of the ASNOM (Anti-Fascist Assembly for 
the National Liberation of Macedonia) provided part of the historical legacy on which the present 
Macedonian state was founded. The Greeks also objected to the Article 3 of the Macedonian 
constitution, which stated that “the borders of the Republic of Macedonia may be changed only 
in accordance with the constitution. Beside this the Greeks reacted to the Article 49, which 
stated the republic shall care the status and the rights of Macedonians living in the neighboring 
countries and assist them in their cultural development and promote ties with them.“ All of them
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along with the maps indicating Aegean Macedonia within the boundaries of FYROM has been 
perceived as proof to a clear Slav irredentism.*^
The debate between Greece and Macedonia thereof, led to Greece to launch an aggressive policy 
against Macedonia with this state’s declaration of independence. By virtue of her seats in the 
international organizations, Greece began to blockade the way of Macedonia in international 
arena. Besides it, Greece was the member of almost all organizations Macedonia intended to 
adhere for its vital requirements like security, economic well-being, political help particularly in 
the face of the ongoing Serbian aggression and growing tension with its ethnic Albanians. On all 
the platforms Greece had a position that it could easily exert its influence over the other member 
states not to give way to Macedonia.*^ After 15 September, 1991, the date of the declaration of 
independence, outside the states emerged with dissolution of Yugoslavia, namely Bosnia 
Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia, Macedonia was recognized firstly by Bulgaria whereas the 
Greeks did not satisfy with only refusing to recognize Macedonia but also objected to other
countries recognition. 14
3.1.2 The Requirements for Diplomatic Recognition and the Badintei Commission
On December 17, 1991, upon the pressure of Greece, the Councils of Ministers of the EC in 
Brussels announced that it accepted the approval of the arbitration commission under the 
chairmanship of Robert Badinter, the president of the French Constitutional Court as a 
precondition for recognition of the newly independent republics. This meant each republic had to 
prove to have fulfilled the requirements of recognition the commission - so-called Badinter
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Commission- determined; sufficient level of democracy, human rights, protection of minorities, 
progress towards a market economy and commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes.'^ In 
addition, the republics had to guarantee that they had no territorial claims against any neighboring 
country, including the “use of a name which implied territorial claims”.**^
On January 6, 1992 the Macedonian Parliament adopted two amendments to the Macedonian 
constitution to convince the EC of its peaceful intentions. Amendment 1 stated that the republic 
had no territorial claims against any neighboring state, and the borders of the republic could be 
changed only in accordance with “generally accepted international norms”. Amendment 2 
stipulated that the republic would not interfere in the internal affairs of other states.”  In June 
1992 the Badintem Commission announced that of all the former Yugoslav republics only 
Slovenia and Macedonia fulfilled the conditions for the recognition. In addition, it specifically 
ruled that the use of the name “Macedonia” did not imply territorial claims toward any 
neighboring state.'* Despite the fact that many in Europe considered the recognition as the only 
way to assist the republic in its redressing the economic grievances and consequently to maintain 
the regional stability, and that they believed the Greek arguments were groundless, “in the 
interest of organizational unity” the EC continued to support the Greek position and announced 
on January 15, 1992 that it would recognize Slovenia and Croatia but not Macedonia.
When the Councils of Ministers of the EC met in May 1992, they agreed to recognize the 
Republic of Macedonia but only under a name that was acceptable to the parties concerned. A 
month later, the EC adopted a position that was closer to the Greek position and declared that it 
would recognize the republic only “under a name which would not include the term Macedonia”.
45
The US pursued the same course. Most observers agreed that the EC decision sprang from the 
possibility of the Greek rejection to ratify the Maastricht Treaty.“  However, there was a general 
consensus among all observers that Greece was running the risk of losing its “democratic image” 
and “placing itself on the margins of Europe”.^ * The Greek side set a precondition for the 
acceptance of the republic as a legal entity. Macedonia had to adopt a new name other than 
Macedonia, and they offered “the Republic of Skopje” as the name to the republic, Macedonians 
naturally refused it. On the other hand, even though EU did not recognize Macedonia with its 
declared name, it did not accept the name Greece tailored for it.^ ^
3.1.3 The UN and the US Mediation and Resolution of the Conflict
Macedonia applied to the UN for the membership on January 7, 1993. Upon vociferous Greek 
objections, a draft resolution of the UN on Macedonian membership on which Britain, France 
and Spain put their signature on condition that the state would temporarily adopt the name of 
“Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYROM) was sent to the Greek government. With 
Athen's consent, the UN Security Council approved Macedonia’s admission to the UN with the 
temporary name, FYROM on April 9, 1993.“  After this agreement Greek public opinion seemed 
to have appeased, at least temporarily whereas the Macedonians protested what they say as 
incompetence their government displayed took to the streets of the major cities of Macedonia 
and in the parliament ruling government could survive a vote of no confidence only with a slight 
margin.“  In addition, concomitantly, the UN Security Council prepared a resolution authorized 
the co-chairmen of the conference on former Yugoslavia: David Oven and Cyrus Vance to 
mediate between Greece and FYROM.
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Meanwhile, Albania which was uneasy about the treatment meted out to the Macedonian officials 
to Albanian minority in FYROM began to support Greek efforts to blockade the admission of the 
republic into important organizations. Upon the Greco-Albanian pressure FYROM was not 
admitted to full membership in CSCE. It accepted FYROM only as an associate member and 
authorized a delegation to mediate between the parties. This delegation immediately after its 
appointment called on the European countries to recognize Macedonia. Greece naturally 
reacted angrily to this recognition and touched off a new strategy through the blockade of oil 
deliveries to Macedonia on December 31, 1993.
Political commentators in Greece had long prophesied that even de facto recognition of FYROM 
would have meant the end of Mitsotakis government in that such a thing was fundamentally 
unacceptable to the Greek public opinion. Mitsotakis had also been under pressure from the 
leaders of international community to recognize the republic before it was too late because the 
survival of moderate Gligorov could not be guaranteed much longer without recognition.^^ 
Opposite of what the Western capitals was concerned about occurred; PASOK with its hardline 
leader Papandreou and then hard-liners like Samaras outnumbered respectively moderate figures 
in the Greek legislature. At personal level Papandreou himself had a long history of antipathy 
toward the Slav speakers both abroad and in Greece.^’ In this context, Greece would probably 
not observe the international conventions on minority rights thereby pushing Slav-speakers to 
adopt more militant policies toward the Greek government.^* After the general elections held on 
October 10, 1993, as it was expected. Prime Minister Papandreou declared that the new 
government’s strategy was ‘no dialogue” with Macedonia.On February 16, 1994 in a week 
following the recognition of FYROM by the United States, Athens which thought the US
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government took side with the republic against itself,^ ® started an all-out oil and commodity 
embargo- excluding food and medicine against FYROM. However as Greece embarked upon 
such a strategy, it ran into some heavy pressures from its European partners at least to start a 
dialogue because any trade embargo to be imposed on the weak economy of FYROM would 
inevitably produce some undesirable results for the livelihood of the Macedonian citizens and 
stability and the security of this country. Indeed Macedonia was long suffering the burden of the 
UN Security Council’s Resolutions that envisioned imposition of a strict embargo on Yugoslavia 
upon which Macedonia's economy had been heavily dependent.^*
Upon the Greek embargo the members of the EU demanded the clarifications from Athens at a 
meeting of the troika on February 18, 1994. Greece was now both violating the EU’s trade rules 
promulgated in the article 13 of the Maastricht Treaty and with its defiance was encouraging the 
Serbian recalcitrance faced with the NATO ultimatum countdown in Bosnia. Greece defended 
itself invoking the articles of the same treaty’s articles 36 and 224 which authorized the members 
to take measures against a country which was a source of international tension. At their 
February 24, 1994 meeting the European foreign ministers acted cautiously towards Greece 
because the Bosnian crisis reached its climax and they did not want to appear indecisive 
particularly to the Serbs. The foreign ministers denounced Greece’s violation of the Maastricht 
Treaty rules envisaging free trade and authorized Hans van den Broeck, the EU Foreign Affairs 
Commissioner to mediate to forg a dialogue between the two sides. Jacques Delors, the 
European Commission President, also sent a letter to the Greek prime minister warning that if the 
sanctions were not lifted, his country would be tried in the European Court of Justice.”  With the 
failure of the mediation efforts, Delors requested the Greek government to add the dispute to the
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agenda for its foreign ministers meeting on 26-27 March 1994 in loannina. At the meeting the 
EU bolded its stance toward the matter. Greece that remained under heavy pressure and had to 
make a choice between continuing the embargo or defending itself in the European Court of 
Justice. On April 6, 1994 the EU’s “friendly threat” was transformed into one-week ultimatum. '^*
The Greeks reacted angrily to the appearance of the possibility for European Commission to 
submit to the European Court and claimed that this kind of statements would encourage and 
increase the intransigence of the Macedonians.^* Nevertheless the decision of the Commission 
seemed to have created some effect on Greece. With energetic Holbrooke diplomacy that 
considered the solution to the problem of Macedonia as an important part of the US peace and 
stability plan over all the Balkan Peninsula, the Greeks yielded to the pressures and agreed to 
come to the talks to be held in New York.^* On September 15, 1995 the Greek and Macedonian 
foreign ministers signed an agreement in New York on the normalization of the relations between 
the two countries. The agreement provided for the recognition of FYROM by Greece, the 
establishment of diplomatic relations, and it also set out conditions for the lifting of the embargo 
upon FYROM by Greece in 30 days. The issue of the name of Macedonia was not part of the 
agreement. The Greek minister noted that talks on the name of Macedonia would begin in about 
a month. In the same context, the interim accord was put into force by the signature of the parties 
on October 13, 1995 in New York.^’
Although the parties reached the agreement in which the Macedonians relinquished their most 
important national symbol, the sixteen rayed “Sun of Vergina”, the Greeks have still been 
skeptical about the real intentions of the Macedonians. According to some Greek journalist and
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authors the outcome might well be regarded as a tactical maneuver by the Macedonians to 
deceive the world to what they have made an enormous concession, and the Greeks would be the 
next.^* Some other Greek intellectuals promptly criticized the Greek government policies towards 
FYROM and accused the government of pushing Skopje into the arms of Sofia and Ankara. 
According to them, Greece sacrificed its security priorities for the sake of an absurd matter and 
opened the field to irredentist projects. According to these authors, the first objective of the 
Greek government must have been “to enhance the independence and stability of the new state” 
and to prevent either a Greater Bulgaria or a Greater Albania and must have preferred a buffer 
state in the center of the Balkans^  ^ in that an unstable Macedonia implied southward influx of 
economic immigrants inside Greece. Moreover a land sharing mania could have dragged Greece 
into a war with Turkey.'**’ The second objective of Greece must have been to bring FYROM 
within the Greek orbit and to make it as dependent on Greece as possible.
They pointed out that Greece's arguments in this matter were difficult to explain. Indeed, the 
Greeks ran into great difficulties in explaining their policy and attaining some support for it from 
its European partners. With the embargo Greece lost its credibility in the eyes of foreign 
investors, and local business along the borderline was hurt seriously. Once the Greek authorities 
could not take healthy decisions regarding what matters constituted priorities of the Greek 
foreign policy, bypassing Turkey and the Cyprus issue, the feeling of insecurity was intensified 
and feelings of insecurity fed parochialism that rendered the outsiders to see the matters 
excessively Greek-centered terms and to ignore them. As Prevelakis underlined, Greece, 
politically and intellectually unprepared, made a fatal mistake as in the Cyprus problem of 1974 
on the chessboard of the Balkans.'" However the Greek government saw the growing influence
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of Turkey over both Albania and Macedonia and began to seek a ground for compromise with 
these countries.
Nevertheless despite the provisional agreement the problem relevant to the presence of the 
prolongation of “Former Yugoslav Republic o f’ in the name of the state has still concerned the 
Macedonian administration. Skopje has frequently stressed a state with the title of ‘Former 
Yugoslavia” which no longer existed, and demanded the removal of the prolongation from the 
name. Meanwhile, there has been no concrete and satisfying development on the name issue. 
Macedonia has since been making its case. Macedonia seems to have consented to the use of the 
name of the republic by the parties with different ways.“*^ It is also obvious that the Greeks have 
realized that the diplomatic mediation carried out by Cyrus Vance could not last forever and the 
Greek government should rescue itself from the burden of such a problem that has pushed it to 
the margins of international politics. Thus they have left a great maneuver gap to Vance and 
delivered their consent on an acceptable formula he may put forth.'*'*
3.2 Relations Between Macedonia and Bulgaria: The Unseen Part of the Macedonian 
Conflict
After the death of Georgi Dimitrov, the new leadership in Bulgaria decided not to recognize the 
existence of a separate nation under the title of Macedonians.'*^ From that time onward, the 
Bulgarian authorities pursued a repressive policy and those who were identified as the pro- 
Macedonian were harshly persecuted.^ Under the reigns of Zhivkov who cemented his control 
over the party since 1956, the ethnic policies that were based on the rejection of the existence of
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separate nationalities within a “unified socialist Bulgarian nation” held their sway.^’ The collapse 
of the Soviets along with other communist regimes brought about drastic changes on Bulgaria's 
attitude toward the different ethnicities living within the boundaries of Bulgaria. Yet the 
Macedonian problem was considerably different, and distinguished itself from other ethnic 
problems the post-Cold War Bulgarian regime had to cope with.“** The emergence of a sovereign 
Macedonian state complicated the situation. The Bulgarians realized that the previous 
catastrophes were the results of the aspirations to attain one goal, namely Bulgarian national 
unification.In the early 1990s the situation was more complicated and perilous even than in the 
late nineteenth century, now that the Soviet protectorate was over. Thus the loneliness of Sofia 
induced it to adopt much more painstaking policies especially toward its Balkan neighbors. The 
outbreak of the Yugoslav crisis also raised the concerns of Bulgaria. The country was suffering 
severe economic hardships especially after the loss of the Middle East, Soviet and Balkan 
markets at the end of the Cold War and had to shoulder a heavy foreign debt, about 13 billion 
dollars. The UN embargo against Serbia deteriorated the economic situation, now that the 
Bulgarian links with Europe was cut off.*“
It was obvious that the Bulgarian government’s careful approach to the ongoing international 
crises sprang from the top prioriti s that the Bulgarian governments determined with the collapse 
of the communism. The most distinguished one of these top priorities was the acceptance of 
Bulgaria to the West’s respectable and prosper community. Therefore, the post Cold-War 
Bulgaria determined the adherence to European community. Council of Europe as the first vital 
steps for its future.*' Bulgaria foreign policy objectives had two outcomes;*^ The country was to 
be a peace-loving rather than irredentist and to refrain from forming alliances and joining axes
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proposed from various directions because of the country’s geographical location; from New 
Byzantium, Pan-Slavic or Orthodox confederations. Secondly Bulgaria was not to interfere in the 
Yugoslav crisis and to abstain from policies that would irritate Greece and Turkey; that is, 
Bulgaria was now much more vulnerable to its former foes’ positions especially in the platforms 
to which Bulgaria intended to adhere.”
The other main condition for the membership in the Western institutions was the establishment of 
a stable and democratic government that would redress the grievances of the former totalitarian 
regime. After the November 1989 coup d’etat the Bulgarians created a democratic constitution, 
including procedures invoking the guarantee for human rights. Since then there have been three 
highly competitive parliamentary elections and a successful presidential election, a functioning 
executive branch of government.”  In addition Bulgaria embarked upon erasing former 
militaristic and Russophily image”  At the same time, the Europe agreements were extended into 
the Balkans in the beginning of the 1990s. Bulgaria and Romania concluded these agreements for 
an unlimited period for each country for transition to a second phase for matters other than 
trade. Therefore, it was obvious that nature of a possible partnership with Europe would 
inevitably urge Bulgaria to approach to the conflictual Macedonian issue more leniently.
3.2.1 Declaration of Independence by Macedonia and Bulgarian Politics
Bulgaria was the first countiy recognized the independence of Macedonia with its declared name. 
However, the Bulgarian view was that there was no a separate Macedonian nation, and that the 
Slav-Macedonians were actually Bulgarians and that the language they spoken was a different
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version of Bulgarian. The other controversial point was the recognition of the existence of a 
Macedonian minority in the boundaries of the Bulgarian state. For Bulgaria, one thing was clear; 
the creation of a Macedonian republic had not only undermined its territorial integrity but also 
created a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria as well as a controversial Bulgarian minority in 
FYROM.”  Because of the explosive nature of the matter both capitals refused to acknowledge 
the existence of the mentioned minorities within their borders.** Up to now mostly thanks to the 
official visits and mutual statements about good-wills of the capitals, the prevailing aura that has 
been particularly on the Bulgarian side has turned into a willingness to redress the communist 
regimes mistakes in several phases of the Bulgaro-Macedonian relationship.That the 
unresolved language issue with FYROM embodies the main obstacle for Bulgaria's admission 
into NATO is another reason for Bulgaria trying to calm situation between the two countries. 
The general aura has been that nobody would admit Bulgaria into European structures or NATO 
with issues that may affect other countries.*” It is obvious that the Bulgarians would not permit 
this problem to obstruct their membership in such vital organizations.
However, some argue that “the Bulgarian attitude toward the Macedonians is that of a big 
brother who waits patiently for this younger brother to come to his sense.”*’ They hold that 
according to the Bulgarians, there were two solutions to the ongoing Macedonian problem; 
either the annexation of the largest portion of Macedonia by Bulgaria; or the recognition of the 
independent Macedonia as a second Bulgarian state. Hence the Bulgarian policy toward FYROM 
could be described to be a “wait-and-see” policy; Bulgaria waits for an imminent Macedonian 
crisis to cause some of the Macedonians to turn to Bulgaria for help, an incident which would
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legitimize a Bulgarian intervention using the protection of the population that returned to its real 
identity as a pretext.®^
3.2.2 The UMO Dinden
Appearance of a Macedonian state has some potential disturbing points for the internal stability
of Bulgaria. The most outstanding matter, as it has been mentioned above, was the fact that the
< )
Macedonians lived and were pressed under the communist rule’s iron fist has now found a new 
external protector for their cause albeit this protector is considerably weak and unable to 
safeguard even its own territorial integrity. In March 1990 a communiqué from an organization 
called itself the Solidarity and Struggle Committee of Pirin Macedonia (Bulgarian Macedonia) 
stated that the Pirin Macedonians decided to fight alongside their brethren in Greece to 
accomplish the unification of all Macedonians. More serious and disturbing statements came from 
the Independent Macedonian Organization, Ilinden, chaired by Angelov Solunski in early 1990. 
This organization underlined the Macedonians’ demands for cultural and national autonomy in 
Bulgaria.®^
The most important Macedonian organization, the United Macedonian Organization (UMO) 
Ilinden, was founded on 14 April 1990. At its founding meeting, the organization accepted a 
constitution and an eleven-article program. The constitution declared that the organization should 
strive for the acceptance of the ethnic Macedonians’ fair rights through democratic ways and 
within the framework of Article 19 of Helsinki Declaration on Human Rights and Article 52 of 
the Bulgarian constitution. In addition, the constitution underlined that the organization should
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refrain from activities that would violate the territorial integrity of the Bulgarian state as well as 
from separatist, chauvinist propaganda.*“* The activities of the UMO Ilinden was perceived by the 
Bulgarian authorities as part of a plot designed by Yugoslavs to dismember Bulgaria. Therefore, 
the Bulgarian courts have constantly refused its becoming a legal political organization.
Although at the beginning the organization seemed moderate and careful in the methodology 
through which it would promote the Macedonian cause, the Bulgarian authorities’ firm stance 
toward the existence of such an organization led to sharp divisions in the organization between 
the moderates and hard-liners.** The moderate flank headed by Stoyan Georgiev objected to the 
use of force to acquire the eventual aim of the ethnic Macedonians and in place of illegal 
methods, he adopted the use of legal political channels as much as possible. Georgiev and his 
companions also encouraged the establishment of close links with FYROM. On the other hand, 
the hard-liners led by Kostadinov accused the moderates of betraying the Macedonian cause, and 
even of being pro-Bulgarian and of reneging on signed agreements respecting the issue of 
autonomy, the church, schools, radio and TV, as well as language. He vociferously stressed that 
the Macedonians had the right to seek the means to unite themselves, and it would be done 
through either international organizations like CSCE or UN, or other ways.**
There are several other political organizations which promoted the Bulgarian-ness of 
Macedonians, and they were naturally set up by those identifying themselves as part of ethnic 
Bulgarian nation like Dimitrav Gotsev’s Internal Macedonian Organization- Union of 
Macedonian Societies (VMRO-SMD). The supporters of the organization are mostly 
descendants of the émigrés from Macedonia as well as from Pirin. The organization’s program
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underlined that the organization shall not permit the denationalization and assimilation of the 
Bulgarians living in the Aegean and Vardar Macedonia. The leaders also called the Greek 
government to recognize the existence of the Bulgarian minority in the Aegean Macedonia and to 
set up Bulgarian schools in the region. The organization categorized the perceived perils that 
threaten the Bulgarian national unity as well. Naturally the UMO-Ilinden has taken the first place 
on the list.®’ Besides VMRO-SMD there are several respectively more chauvinist political 
organizations. One of them is the National Democratic Party of Ivan Georgiev who has been 
acknowledged by his chauvinist approach to the matter. On the other hand those who did not 
satisfy with the allegedly tolerant approach of VMRO-SMD set up a more radical organization in 
1990; The All Bulgarian Macedonia Union. The organization headed by Hristov Tzavela 
reportedly wanted to create a fascist-type regime and harbored similarities with VMRO of the 
past. Another effective organization is Macedonian Scientific Institute that has assumed the 
function of allegedly purging the Macedonian history from distortions mostly in favor of the 
Bulgarian interests.®*
3.3 Albanian-Macedonian Relationships
Although some disagreements regarding the ethnic Albanians in FYROM and constant reports 
acknowledging Albanian insurgencies’ infiltration inside FYROM and arm smuggling along the 
borders between the two countries, the relations with Albania has never molded into a crisis 
reminiscent to that with Greece. Initially Tirana joined Greece and did not recognize FYROM 
unless Skopje addressed the grievances of the ethnic Albanians and the estimated 300,000 ethnic 
Albanians living in FYROM were guaranteed the same rights as the Slav population. Only after
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the initiatives of the Turkish president Turgut Ozal, Tirana relinquished its intransigent position 
and decided to recognize FYROM on 26 April 1993.*  ^Albania's Berisha softened his approach 
and called for the Albanian groups in FYROM to work with President Gligorov’s government. 
Yet tensions remained high particularly when the incidents of border shootings of Albanians 
continued throughout 1993.™ Though Albania sent its representatives to Skopje to improve the 
bilateral relations, the border shootings increased in commensurate with the allegations of black 
market dealings involving drug and arms smuggling.’* Alleged existence of an Albanian terrorist 
organization in Western Macedonia -so called UNIKOM- which advocated use of terrorist 
methods to resolve the Albanian question continued to give rise to tensions between the two 
capitals for some time.™ All this led many officials in FYROM to think that Tirana played a 
significant role in the sharpening of Albanian dissatisfaction and in the rebellion of hard-liners 
against the moderate Albanian leadership in Macedonia.
Although it recognized the republic, Tirana unveiled its reservations concerning FYROM's 
application for full membership status of CSCE until the rights of Albanians in FYROM are 
increased.™ In this context, at the CSCE meeting in June 1993 FYROM's request to become a 
member of CSCE, was once again opposed by Albania along with Cyprus and Greece. Although 
the reports of the CSCE monitoring missions were satisfactory and supported the acceptance of 
the state to this European organization, Albania, once again, emphasized the unfavorable status 
of the Albanian minority. Albanian delegates asked that the status of the Albanians in the 
Constitution be changed, stressing that they had shown a great deal of cooperation in Macedonia 
so far.™ However, during the Greek embargo in 1994, being concerned with the deterioration of 
the economic situation of ethnic Albanians, Albania agreed with FYROM to augment the passage
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points between the two countries to permit use of the Adriatic port of Dürres and open an air 
corridor between Skopje and Tirana with the support of Italy.’’
On the other hand, the Albanian support to FYROM was damaging the Greek tactics to bring 
Skopje to its heel, and in return Mitsotakis raised the question of ethnic Greeks’ status in 
Albania. The Greek demarche awakened Tirana to the threat that might come from its Greek 
minority. Although the number of Greeks has been challenging;’* they did not constitute any 
serious threat to Tirana and some minority rights were granted to Albania’s minorities albeit for a 
long period they had shared the oppression of Hoxha regime without discriminating.”  In this 
posturing it was obvious that Albania, dealing with Serbia and now Greece, needed strong ties 
with Turkey, Bulgaria, FYROM, Slovenia and Croatia too. Of all those relations, the one with 
FYROM seemed to be the most important point of focus once this country served a physical 
buffer between Greece and Serbia. On the other hand Albania was vital for FYROM since only 
this country could offer FYROM access to the Adriatic.’*
On FYROM front, the identification of the Albanian question has been helping the normalization 
of relations between Serbia and FYROM. It must arrange the dose of rapprochement with Serbia 
very carefully without subordinating itself to a Serbian satellite sta tus.A fter the resignation of 
Sali Berisha, the Socialist government in Tirana embarked upon a new strategy aiming at erasing 
the conspiratorial image of the former government. As his recent careful attitude toward the 
Kosovo/a crisis has indicated the new premier Fatos Nano seems to be favoring more painstaking 
and pro-Greek policies in the region.*®
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Bordering FYROM and Albania to the south and southwest this province is now located in the 
heart of the Balkan peninsula. The problem essentially originates from the struggle of the ethnic 
Albanians to assert their right to self-determination against the Serbs.** Kosovo/a carries a 
historical and symbolic significance in the eyes of the Serbs despite the fact that they constitute a 
mere 10 percent of the total population. The importance of the region is not limited to its 
historical value. To retain its links and influence with Montenegro and FYROM as well as to 
secure access to Greece and the Aegean ports are the main priorities of Serbian foreign policy 
Prishtina lies a mere 90 kilometers north of Skopje. Leskovac in Ksosovo/a is situated at a similar 
distance from Kumanovo. Both Leskovac and Kumanovo lie on the main motorway and rail 
routes through the Vardar Valley linking Serbia to the Greek port of Thessaloniki. Therefore, a 
possible Albanian secession would leave the Serbs to the mercy of the Albanians.*^ Within this 
context the Serbian rule has completely rejected the Albanian demands and even conducted a 
harsh repression policy against them.*^
Tensions between the two peoples had its roots in historical developments. Despite Tito-politics, 
the Albanians never relinquished ti.3 feeling of discrimination. *'* The Serbian aspirations over the 
region was bolded with the leadership of Milosevic in 1987. Milosevic, as the charismatic leader 
of the Serbian communist Party, mobilized the masses and endorsed the demonstrations to 
protest the autonomous status of Kosovo/a along with the rising secessionist sentiments among 
the Albanians.*  ^ In 1989 Milosevic succeeded in gaining the majority he needed in the Kosovo/a 
Assembly to retract Kosovo/a's status as an autonomous province. He adeptly used the Serb-led
3.3.1 The Kosovo/a Question and Macedonia
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Assembly to cement the control of Belgrade over Kosovo/a’s police, civil defense, courts and 
selection of officials.** Upon the deprival of even their established rights, the ethnic Albanians 
embarked upon the establishment of their own shadow-state. *’ They created a parallel state 
administration which functioned in several classic public services like education and health under 
the shadow government of Ibrahim Rugova and boycotted the Belgrade-administered
institutions 88
Until recently, the Albanian leadership in Kosovo/a has adopted a respectively moderate 
approach to the problem against all odds. However, the very characteristics of the problem has 
posed some threats to the continuity of moderate policies primarily because any policy of 
stepping back would mean the downfall of the ethnic leaders. As Rugova reiterated his 
opposition to violence,the rising tensions have produced some effective dissidents against 
him.’* In the face of the rising tensions Milosevic who based his strategy on the denial of the right 
of self-determination to the ethnic Albanians might increase support to extremists and decide a 
showdown.’  ^ Unfortunately, a spillover of Serbian-Albanian conflict into FYROM has always 
remained a really scenario since many Albanians have familial or historical ties with the ethnic 
Albanians in K oso v o /a .O n e  the other hand, Macedonia is concerned with the illegal 
immigration inside FYROM, particularly to the western portion of the country where the ethnic 
Albanians inhabited densely. The illegal immigration induced Macedonian governments to take 
some firm measures because immigration altered the ethnic composition of the population in the 
favor of the ethnic Albanians who based their appeal for autonomy on the population figures.’“*
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In addition, the present Albanian political parties competing within the Macedonian political party 
system have been very sensitive to the situation in Kosovo/a. Albanian political party leaders 
have not refrained from expressing their overt support to Kosovar Albanians.®* This situation was 
expected to place the Serbian-Macedonian relations under the Albanian mortgage. The 
agreement in April 1996 between the FR Yugoslavia and FYROM in which the parties 
recognized each other indicated that this pessimism was not in vain. The reason of the debacle 
was the Albanian criticism on the grounds that the said agreement recognized the new 
Yugoslavia as the continuation of Serbia with its former boundaries that had been stipulated in 
the 1913 Bucharest Agreement, because by this way Skopje recognized Serbia’s ownership on
Kosovo/a 96
It is obvious that at this point Macedonia has to pursue a painstaking policy not to alienate both 
Tirana and Belgrade. The Macedonians have supported US policies aiming at the preservation of 
existing boundaries in the region. Although Kosovar Albanians expressed their disappointment 
with the Dayton Agreement that ignored Kosovo/a question, Skopje underlined that the Dayton 
reiterated the importance of the respect for borders.®’ The outer world also extended its help to 
Skopje and the borders of this country has been protected by foreign troops under the aegis of 
UN.
3.3.2 Problem of Ethnic Albanians Living in Macedonia
Serb nationalism under the leadership of Milosevic gave rise to tension in Yugoslavia in general 
and particularly in Kosovo/a. Soon after Milosevic's take over in Serbia the fate of the Kosovar
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Albanians closely connected with that of the ethnic Albanians of Macedonia and perhaps further. 
Increasing Serb repression in Kosova alarmed their brethren in Albania and FYROM. 
Nevertheless, ethnic tensions in Macedonia never reached an alarming level as in Kosovo/a. The 
main reason why the Macedonian-Albanians did not attempt of a strictly determined resistance 
against Skopje was that they were privileged by the right to freely organize themselves. There 
was a hope for compromise.^
But Skopje did not change its stand and advocated the fact that the minority groups living in 
FYROM could easily practice their right i.e., education, participation in politics and so on.*°® The 
Albanians were concerned about the increase in the rights which exceed the limits of the legal 
system, while the small minority groups complained mainly about the application of the laws in 
practice. In particular, an imbalance in the treatment of the Macedonian government to the 
different ethnic groups would deteriorate the situation in two ways; first it turns almost all 
attention to one minority only, giving rise to the likelihood that other minorities will be to some 
extend neglected, and second, it creates tensions among the ethnic groups themselves.
3.3.2.1 The Problems Inherited in the Constitutional Status of the Ethic Albanians in 
Macedonia
The Albanians in Macedonia are concerned with the wording of the constitution, keeping them 
out of the status of the founding nation. Although Skopje made required amendments to the 
constitution for attaining the recognition of the EC, the stress on an unique Macedonian nation 
disturbed the Albanians and induced them to ask the UN to delay the recognition until and unless
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the Macedonian administration recognized the Albanians as a one of the founding nations of 
Macedonia. Fortunately the Albanians have not carried the matter to different platforms rather 
than legal ones. Now there are several political parties established by ethnic Albanians in 
FYROM. Currently two important parties play a pivotal role in Macedonian politics; as the 
moderate flank of the Albanian minority Abdurrahman Aliti’s party; Party for Democratic 
Prosperity (PDP) which now holds five posts in the Macedonian coalition cabinet, which also 
includes the members of the Social Democratic Alliance for Macedonia (SDSM)- the senior 
partner of the coalition government - and the Socialist Party of Macedonia (SP); and as the 
radical flank, the Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians (PDP-A) of Arben Xaferi, which 
was established by those who defected from the PDP allegedly with the endorsement of Sali 
Berisha,“’^  and outside of all Illijaz Halimi’s the People’s Democratic Party (NDP).*®“*
It seems that, both the Slav Macedonians and the ethnic Albanians shared almost the same 
opinions that even moderate PDP was nationalistic party despite the contrasting rhetoric of the 
party leadership from the beginning that the party would stand aloof of the ethnic strife and 
coalitions and work for the welfare of all Macedonians, and for peaceful solutions to the 
problems of all Macedonian citizens. Some even accused the party of being appendage of the 
Albanian Democratic League of Kosovo/a chaired by Ibrahim Rugova aiming at the final stage, 
to separate Kosovo/a and western Macedonia to incorporate them all into Albania. Although 
the party leadership belied these accusations, especially Halili, former president of the party did 
not abstain from carrying the problem into international platforms,*®  ^ he overtly expressed the 
party’s support for territorial autonomy for ethnic Albanians in party congresses. But this stand 
culminated in further divisions among those who favored autonomy along the lines of the
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controversial Illirida declaration, those supporting closer links with Albania and finally those 
opposing any notion of autonomy and advocating a “civic state of Macedonia rather than an 
ethnic one”’®’ It was in fact this question that deeply divided the top-leaders of the party in 1993 
and turned into a main obstacle in resolving the party schism, in which the hawks of the party 
based their strategies on promises to realize such an autonomy. Some other Albanian radicals like 
the members of Albanian National Democratic Party (NDP) supported a federalization for 
Macedonia and demanded an autonomous status for Western Macedonia or Illirida. On the other 
hand, in contrast to the complaints of the Albanians on the ground that they had been deprived of 
the privileges of local self-government, the Slav-Macedonians living in Tetovo and Gostivar 
claimed that the republic of Illirida had been practiced anyway. And more dangerously some 
armed groups of the VMRO-DPMNE supporters- so-called “Defense Committees” appeared in
areas with mixed population around Lake Okhrid and Struga thereby triggering a similar
108response from the Albanian side despite the denials of the PDP.
Until the foundation of the PDP-A of Xhaferi in 1994 the People's Democratic Party (NDP) was 
the most vocal party for the Albanian cause in Macedonia ,and almost solely concerned with 
political issues concerning the Albanian's national demands and a status of the Albanians in 
FYROM as a constitutive people."® The Macedonian public almost unanimously considered this 
party to be radical in all essential aspects dealing with the status of the Albanians.’"  It must be 
pointed out that this party was much more engaged in reacting against the Macedonian 
constitution, than in making any attempts to find a way to start a dialogue of tolerance and 
coming to terms on key issues. As for constitutional issues, NDP has claimed that the situation in 
Kosovo/a and the one in west Macedonia are equal in every way."^ In its program - so-called
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“Political Declaration” - the party underlined its determination to secure a status of a constitutive 
people for the Albanians in Macedonia. Otherwise, the declaration said, all Albanians should join 
in one single Albanian state in the Balkans."^
Another problem has been the tendency toward centralism that jeopardized the positions of the 
Albanians even in their stronghold municipalities, including Tetovo and Gostivar. Some ethnic 
Albanians had already claimed that Albanian-majority districts had far more voters than ethnic 
Macedonian ones, thus violating the "one-person, one-vote" principle. There was some truth in 
this complaint, but the largest ethnic Albanian party was closely consulted by the government 
during a redesigning of the country's municipalities in September."". Besides, some ethnic 
Albanians also complained that alleged discrimination against them in citizenship decisions 
effectively disenfranchises a large portion of their community."’ The recent flag question sparked 
off the incidents in July 1997 that claimed three civilians’ lives, and 250 were wounded 
deteriorated the situation, and brought the question of the extention of privileges that the 
Albanians wished to enjoy."® It seemed that the real problem is not the right to hoist a flag, these 
incidents were only the signals of the resentments between the Albanians and the state authority. 
And the incidents brought the coalition to the brink of collapse due to the Party for Democratic 
Prosperity endorsed the cause"’ created a great problem for the survival of the coalition 
partnership between the PDP and the SDSM."*
Underrepresentation of ethnic Albanians in the military and police has been another major 
grievance of the Albanian community. Even in areas dominated by ethnic Albanians, the police 
force has remained overwhelmingly ethnic Macedonian. According to the Ministry of Interior, the
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police force as a whole has been only 4 percent ethnic Albanian. There has lately been some 
improvement in the proportion of ethnic Albanians recruited into the military. The proportion of 
ethnic Albanians in the ranks has been estimated at 25 percent. Fewer ethnic Albanians are in the 
officer corps, but some progress has been made in this area whereas few ethnic Albanians serve 
as Defense Ministry civilian employees.
Today the Albanian deputies have been the members of the Macedonian government, but many 
among the Albanians have seen the Albanian ministers as powerless and sometimes even traitors. 
Radical parties have constantly accused Aliti’s PDF of betraying the Albanian cause because of 
its willingness to participate in the government of Premier Branko Crvenkovski. This party’s 
participation in the ruling coalition has also caused the leadership to divide. This issue has been a 
subject from which the intra-party relations suffered. The leadership has found it hard to explain 
why it has opted for a political dialogue and balancing, even in situations when it means deviation 
from the fundamentals of the Albanian cause. The deputies and some members of the party seem 
to have politically matured after they entered the coalition, and have started acting more sensibly. 
The evolution in the PDP has been more and more obvious and the unemotional and politically 
wise speeches by the party leaders in Parliament seem to have confused the party branches and 
membership, which used to perceive the party as an Albanian national movement with their own 
national leaders. Nevertheless this gave birth to a new movement, led by the leader of the "hard 
stream", Memduh Tad. The new fraction seriously damaged the party, which was even 
threatened with a further split. On the other hand, the recent local elections on September 17, 
1996 indicated that the nationalist VMRO strengthened its position whereas the Liberal Party and 
the Socialists did badly. Despite its clear victory the Social Democrats’ losses in the capital and
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almost all major cities are extremely important for the opposition because the voters in big cities 
outnumber those in rural areas. Local elections have indicated the time is working in favor of the 
nationalists.*^^ Obviously it is a bad news for the Albanians, as well as for the instability of 
Macedonia.
3.3.2.2 Issue of Census
The first round of the general elections held on November 11, 1990 constituted the climax of the 
debate on the population between the two communities. Macedonians alleged that in a number of 
predominantly Albanian constituencies including Gostivar, Debar, Kumanovo, Struga, Tetovo 
and four in Skopje, the ethnic Albanian voters had voted in more than one constituency and there 
had been some irregularities relating to the numbers of voters since newly-immigrated Albanians 
were not marked elaborately.'^^ Today one of the disturbing points for Skopje is the allegedly 
immigrations of the ethnic Albanians from Kosovo/a. Macedonian authorities claim that they do 
not fulfill the requirements for being a Macedonian citizen and thus they should not be taken into 
account in the census. Albanians responded this by underlining the fact that in the past a number 
of Albanians had left for Kosovo/a or the other parts of Yugoslavia because of the Macedonian 
state’s oppression or in the hope of finding jobs. The Albanians believed that these allegations 
were absurd excuses for preventing a fair representation of the ethnic Albanians in the 
Macedonian constitution.
Representatives of the ethnic Albanian community, by far the largest minority group with 22.9 
percent of the population, had been the most vocal in charging discrimination. Expressing
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concern about government manipulation of the data, the Albanian community boycotted the 1990 
census. According to the Albanians they constituted 40 percent of the Macedonian population. 
An internationally monitored census held during the summer of 1994 to correct the situation was 
marred by some boycott threats. However experts from the Council of Europe monitored the 
conduct of the census and were generally satisfied that it was carried out fairly and accurately, 
and that virtually the entire ethnic Albanian community took part.*^* Nevertheless the census 
matter has remained a question so far and is likely to continue to be so among the Albanians.
3.3.2.3 Problem of Education in Albanian
For most Albanians the most blatant matter with Macedonia has been the education and language 
rights of the ethnic Albanians in FYROM because it has been seen as vital for preserving 
Albanian heritage and culture.'^* The firm stance of the Macedonian authorities caused great 
resentment and boycotts in that the Albanians believed that the government policies were 
designated to create an illiterate Albanian y o u t h . I n  particular rising nationalism along with 
religious sentiments constituted one of the most important bulwark before the projects of 
Macedonian authorities to create a ‘Macedonian citizenry’ which would unite all the peoples of 
the country with no regard to their ethnic and religious affiliations. The insistence of Skopje on 
this matter derives from this concern.
Although the decisive role in Albanian politics was played by nationalism but not religion and 
nationalistic sentiments found favorable ground among particularly young Albanians, some clergy 
- hodzhas- opposed rising nationalism. However the decision of the Macedonian Assembly to
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make an amendment to the law on religious teaching prohibiting the attendance of organized 
religious instructions by young people below 15‘^ ° indicated the vitality of the situation in the 
eyes of Skopje authorities. On the other hand for Skopje, religion especially Islam provides the 
Albanian opposition with a usable instrument to swing the other Muslim communities like Turks, 
Torbeshis and Roma to their side.'^'
Another important issue has been the establishment of an university in February 1995 in defiance 
of the state authorities which would train the students in their native Albanian language. The 
support given by the Tetovo City Assembly, a political stronghold of the ethnic Albanians in 
FYROM, to the initiative for setting up an Albanian university at village of Mala Recica was a 
sign of first interethnic dispute after the elections of 1994. The attempts made by the Macedonian 
administration to suppress the initiative was followed by vast demonstrations throughout the 
country.Despite  the disagreements both the moderate and radical Albanian political parties 
consented to the issue clearly. However Aliti’s moderate approach to the issue raised some 
criticism on the part of radicals. In fact, PDF has been trying to convince the radical flank not to 
push too far and expand the university too quickly. The issue has been, therefore, not whether the 
university ought to be supported but whether to move boldly or cautiously.
Up now, there have been some positive developments regarding the matter. Recently, in the 
beginning of 1997, the Macedonian Parliament has approved the use of minority languages at the 
Faculty of Education in Skopje. From January 31, 1997 trainee teachers belonging to the 
minority groups living in FYROM should be able to attend lectures in their mother tongue.* '^* 
Finally, early 1997, it was announced that a new law on higher education could be passed by the
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end of 1997. One of its main topic would be the regulation of minority language use. Despite the 
shortage of teachers who would be able to perform the lessons in Albanian and constant refusal 
of the administration of the invitation of lecturers from Pristina and Tirana, all Albanian parties 
expect the legalization of Tetovo University, whereas the Slav Macedonian deputies claim that 
those expectations are false.
3.4 Conflictual Relations of Macedonia with Serbia
As Socialist Yugoslavia disintegrated, “the South Slav Question assumed a new form; the 
“Serbian Question”, arose out of the issue of fate and status of Serbian diaspora". Furthermore 
the Serbian Question could evolve into a new Eastern Question through the ethnic 
dissatisfactions in Kosovo/a, and FYROM. Within the framework of the ideas of Greater 
Serbia, Serbian nationalists exacerbated the concerns of Macedonians by underlining the claim of 
Serbia over Macedonia and over the identity of the Macedonians. Although Gligorov along with 
Izzetbegovic had formed a block and opposed the fragmentation of Yugoslavia, and advocated 
Macedonia’s taking its place as a sovereign state in a new Yugoslavia to be founded, Milosevic’s 
overt aspirations had induced the Macedonian leadership to change its mind.*^’ Although the 
relations between the two Serbs and the Macedonians not deteriorated such an extent as to 
constitute a serious crisis, the Macedonian leadership continued to perceive the persistency of the 
threat from north, as the agenda of diplomacy has been dominated by the problems such as 
diplomatic recognition, the rights of the ethnic-Serbs living in FYROM and the share of the 
assets of former Yugoslavia among the successor states.
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The decision for departure was considerably risky not least because the decision might urge the 
Serbs to annex Macedonia to Serbia. However Belgrade opted for a policy of non-violence 
against Skopje and Yugoslav National Army (JNA) evacuated the Macedonian territories.*^* The 
reason why JNA withdrew from Macedonia is a considerably speculative matter; There are 
seemingly three reasons influencing the decision of Belgrade. First, Serbia had been 
preoccupied with Croatia and Bosnia at the time, and it was irrational for Belgrade to open a 
second front in the south. Second, Macedonia had been quite sympathetic to Serbia historically 
and the potential for a lucrative economic partnership was in store. Serbia had been the most 
important economic partner of Macedonia and some 62 percent of its trade had been with this 
country. On the other hand Macedonia offered Serbian goods most strategic outlet to the Aegean 
and particularly to the Greek port of Thessaloniki. In addition, nearly all of Macedonia’s 
communication links, be trail or telephone tended to go through Serbia and Belgrade.’“*® Third 
one was that the problems derived from the demands of autonomy of the ethnic Albanians posed 
threat to both countries’ territorial integrity and for that reason Serbia and Macedonia had been 
inevitably natural allies. ’“*’ Governing elite in Skopje initially supported the rise of Milosevic in 
Serbia because of his antagonistic approach to the Kosovo/a Albanians. In addition, some section 
of the Macedonian population, particularly Vlachs remained somewhat pro-Serbian.
On the other hand, one of the greatest beneficiaries of the 1994 elections in FYROM was Serbia. 
The ex-communist “nomenklatura” in that country who supported Gligorov government indebted 
their positions essentially to the Yugoslav governments of Belgrade. Despite the separation.
3.4.1 Macedonia’s Security Problems with Serbia
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many links had been maintained openly or clandestinely in the last years. Belgrade newspapers 
supporting strongly the Milosevic regime in Belgrade could be found easily in Skopje, but the 
same thing could not be said for their Albanian and Bulgarian equivalents. Serbs often “thinly 
disguised as Macedonians” took high posts in the army, police and other state bodies .O w ing  
to their position in Macedonian nation, the ethnic Serbs saw unification of Serbia with 
Yugoslavia at least under a loose confederation as a vital step to safeguard their privileged 
positions.
Nevertheless the Bosnian conflict and ongoing brutalities urged the Macedonian leadership to 
perceive Serbia as a perilous neighbor. Until the Dayton and deployment of NATO Peace 
Implementation Force (IFOR), one of the primary concerns of Skopje was the spill-over of the 
conflict to Macedonia. This concern was increased after Gligorov’s successful negotiation for 
the withdrawal of the JNA forces from Macedonia in March 1992 because the withdrawal left 
this tiny country almost completely defenseless once the army divisions took the weaponry in the 
arsenal of the country away. And Skopje had long been irritated by some provocative statements 
of the Serbian President Milosevic. However Gligorov successfully resisted the threats from 
Belgrade that even dared to offer Athens the carve-up of that country. In addition Macedonian 
leadership decided to put an end to financing the war expenditures of Serbia and the 
hyperinflation the war borne on weak shoulders of Macedonia by continuing to use “Yugoslav 
dinar”.*“** Serbia's hawkish attitude induced Gligorov to warn the international community about 
the imminence of a threat from the north and south combination.
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With the situation deteriorating, the UN Security Council in its Resolution 795 dated 11 
December 1992, unanimously decided to sent a UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) -then UN 
Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP)- to FYROM. Between 28 November and 3 December 
1992 an exploratory mission was dispatched form the headquarters of the UNPROFOR in Zagreb 
to FYROM. UNPREDEP had an integrated military and civilian command. Its military mandate 
included monitoring and reporting any development that could jeopardize the security of the 
country. This part of the mandate was carried out by the peacekeepers through fixed observation 
posts (OPs) along the borderline, temporary observation posts (OPTs) and patrols by foot, 
vehicle and helicopter. The OPs landed along 240 km- long borderline between Serbia and 
FYROM. Because of the lack of physical markers that identified the border between the two 
countries the border line was drawn by the UN forces until the recognition agreement between 
Belgrade and Skopje. With the Security Council Resolution 908 of 31 March 1994, a civilian 
mandate, envisaging mediation in inter-ethnic conflicts was added to the force as well.
Since the Dayton Agreement, although in Serbia the anti-government demonstrations of 
opposition was crashed by Milosevic, he has employed a policy not to irritate the Westerners 
whom Serbia acutely needed for the finance of economic damages that the protracted conflict 
had inflicted on the country. Although the demonstrations seemed to have been based upon the 
democratic wills of the masses, the actual problem was economic hardships.Under these 
circumstances Milosevic had to pursue a policy aiming at alleviating the concerns of FYROM. 
Nevertheless, despite the opposition against himself had a democratic outlook, the member of the 
coalition so-called ‘Zajedno’ was comprised of some figures who shared the Greater Serbia ideal 
with Milosevic.
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Another important issue about the Macedonian administration is the presence of the political 
parties established by ethnic Serbs living in FYROM and their political programs. Like Albanian 
minority since the foundation of the republic the Serbs have demanded education in their native 
language, fair representation in the government agencies and the Parliament as the member of 
“nationalities of Macedonian state” and so forth. The FR Yugoslavia has supported the ethnic 
Serb’ demands.
Ethnic Serbs now constitute 2.2 per cent of the total population, or 44.159 people according to 
the 1991 census but in contrast they have claimed to be up to 300.000. In 1991 they also 
followed suit with ethnic Albanians and held demonstrations, raising the demand of recognition 
as founding nation. The situation came to deteriorate with the appearing designs of chauvinist 
Serb groups, primarily of Vojislav Seselj, in Yugoslavia entailing foundation of a Serbian 
autonomous Region of the Kumanovo Valley and the Skopska Cma Gora. In 1992 the 
Association of Serbs and Montenegrins in FYROM pointed to the problems of education in 
Serbian language, and that these peoples had no any single radio whereas the Turks, Roma and 
Vlachs had both educational facilities and media outlets. They also complained about the 
ignorance of Skopje authorities to their demands. The course of the events came to a head in 
early 1993 when in Kuceviste village Serbian youth clashed with police.
Serb minority founded and registered on 16 March 1992 its political party under the leadership of 
Boro Ristic to promote their demands and to prevent waht they called national and spiritual
3.4.2 Problems of the Ethnic Serbs
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destruction and assimilation of the Serbs of FYROM. The political program of the party that 
served as a basis for the entire activity of the party, connected with certain political and religious 
subjects in Serbia. The party program reflected the northern orientation of the party, its open 
dislike for authorities in FYROM, its refusal to accept the newly emerged situation following the 
disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, its continual insistence on a new Yugoslavia and alike. 
The party also contacted the Serbian Orthodox Church, especially with the Bishop of Vranje, 
Pahomie. In early 1993 with the DPS chairman’s signature a report was given to the Macedonian 
government on the situation and demands of the Serbs in FYROM. This was the first sign of 
losing political consistency and unclearly defined demands. The report stated a request for 
defining and resolving the legal position of Serbs in FYROM, "introducing equality of Serbs with 
all other nationalities in FYROM."'”
The rising Serbian dissent alarmed the western capitals. To create a common ground between the 
Serbian minority and Skopje authorities, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia 
set up a Working Group on Ethnic and National Minorities. The Working Group began its work 
in October 1991, initiating negotiations between the ethnic Albanians and Macedonian 
government and later extended its activities to the problem of Macedonia with its ethnic Serbs. 
The Group held trilateral meetings between the representatives of the Albanians, Macedonians 
along with the Serbs in 1993. With strenuous efforts of the German ambassador Geertz Ahrens, 
the chairman of the Group, the parties put their signature on the so-called “Agreed Minutes” 
which called for the ethnic Serbs to be recognized as a minority in the constitution,'”  and the 
matter was assigned to an 18-months dead line.
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Immediately afterwards, "Serbia and Montenegro criticized the agreement", a radical flank 
appeared on the scene, describing the agreement as a "betrayal of Serbia". This "radical stream", 
became stronger by the day and resulted in the resignation, "on grounds of too strong influences 
from outside and interference in creation of the party's politics, especially by the Socialist and the 
Radical Party from Serbia, as well as by the Serbian Church, whose 5 senile old leaders cannot 
comprehend the fact that there is a Macedonian nation, Macedonian state and Macedonian 
Orthodox Church".’ ’^ The DPS under its new leadership of Dragisa Miletic that completed its 
first party congress in early March 1996 reiterated their demands and strove for the independent 
Republic of Macedonia to become a part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, initially as a 
single economic system, which irritated the Macedonians.’’*
3.4.3 Succession Problem
Another important debate between FYROM and FR Yugoslavia was the recognition of the 
republic. Although it was under the pressure of the Americans and the Europeans Yugoslavia 
agreed to sign the agreement in which it recognized the independence and sovereignty of 
FYROM only after long debate on some of the points especially pertaining the “succession 
issue”.
FYROM had long been demanding the transfer of the former Yugoslavia’s assets including gold 
reserves, securities and so forth, that should have been inherited by itself. The obstacle was that 
Yugoslavia demanded that the problem be solved bilaterally whereas FYROM insisted on the 
participation of other countries emerged with the dissolution of Yugoslavia. After the signature
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of the Dayton Agreement Serbia offered FYROM the surplus of the weaponry of which within 
the framework of the agreement it had to get rid/*’ Yet the problem has not been fully resolved.
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Macedonian problem is like a set of concentric circles, at the center of which FYROM takes its 
place. In the first circle around the core three competing nations, namely, Greece, Serbia and 
Bulgaria are situated. In the second circle are three other nations that have strong geopolitical 
interests in FYROM, that is Albania, Turkey and Romania; since the Turks or the Ottomans ruled 
the country for centuries and Albanians and Romanians are concerned with well-being of their 
respecting minorities living in Macedonia. Even the Romanians raised their irredentist claims on 
Macedonia, citing the presence of the Vlachs there though Romania has no a common border with 
Macedonia.* To put the Albanians on the second circle may mean underestimating the extend of 
the Albanian problem. As long as the Albanian problem continues to exist in Macedonia the 
Albanians carry on with their irredentist projects aspiring unification of all Albanians under the flag 
of one state, it shall probably be wrong to list Albania among the second-circle nations in the 
Macedonian chestboard.
At the third circle the major European powers and the superpowers are situated. Historically all 
these powers have had their own strategies, be it challenging or conciliating with each other; 
Germany and Austria with their “Drang nach Osten”, Italy with its “Mare Nostrum”, the 
Russian/Soviet Empires with its intention of seizure of an outlet to the warm seas over the Balkan 
peninsula, the English and French interest for the Middle East and Arab World, and the Americans 
with their “containment policy”. Although the actors and forms of intervention changed, the 
strategic interests of Macedonia somewhat remained.”^
CHAPTER IV: MACEDONIAN QUESTION AND WESTERN RESPONSE
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Throughout the history the fate of the region as well as of its inhabitants have been determined by 
the complicated and sometimes unpredictable interactions among the powers situated at different 
layers, with changing political, economic, military motivations. Most of the time the local, 
regional and international conflicts are “interiorized” in the Macedonian question thereby making 
the region one of the hottest spots in the world. ^  The very nature of the conflict that emerged on 
these soils has always attracted international attention to the problems which, at first sight seem 
to be belonging only to those living in the country, once all the belligerents of the conflict vividly 
intended to internationalize the problem. For this reason, as continuation to the second chapter in 
which independence of Macedonia or FYROM and its international implications on the regional 
bases were examined, this new chapter shall handle the problem from a wider perspective. Main 
points that shall be questioned in this chapter are; “what are the effects of the newly emerging 
Macedonian question on the relationship between the global and regional powers; why the 
problem has been perceived as vital and what sort of solutions have been put forth and what kind 
of activities have been carried out to ameliorate the situation in the region.”
4.1 Macedonia: A New Bosnia?
Macedonia region with its demographic composition is reminiscent of Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
for that reason many scholars have defined it as the new epicenter of a possible Balkan turmoil 
after Bosnia. Some contended that although after Dayton the balance of power in the Balkans 
had not shifted to the hegemonic advantage of one specific country or a coalition, a potential 
problem has emerged because of the ‘vacuum effect’ created by the weakness of FYROM.This 
void can be filled or intended to be filled by three neighboring countries as the constant
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belligerents of the Macedonian question. It is clear that such a scenario could not bypass the 
possibility of a great powers intervention once again.
Many authors resembled the current posturing to the situation that prevailed on the verge of the 
Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 . On the other hand the current anxieties feed the feelings of suspicion 
and animosity among the nations of the region, and this aura in the Balkans is now reminiscent of 
the atmosphere that rolled the European nations into a ceaseless Hobbesian obsession -or in 
Bartlett’s word; Hobbesian fear- on the verge of the World War I.* The clear result of heightened 
state of ultra-nationalism and tensions, the nations now tend to form hegemonic or threatening 
alignments in response to real or perceived threats. At this stage the combatants of a possible 
conflict have distinguished themselves; namely Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, Albania and even 
Turkey.*
Many experts have put forth several scenarios up to now; according to the most accepted 
nightmare scenario the crisis shall develop in the following course; an upsurge of violence in 
Kosovo/a would lead to a surge of refugees from Kosovo/a inside Albania and FYROM. “This 
tide of refugees could create a backlash in Macedonia, impelling it to join the Serbian side to 
break the surrounding Albanian ring”.’ Albania, probably having attained the military and 
diplomatic grant of Turkey, shall see no risk to plunge itself into a conflict with Serbia. Once the 
conflict escalated to such a level Greece and Bulgaria shall not refrain from participating. Perhaps 
because of these scenarios possibility of an ethnic Albanian upsurge within the boundaries of 
FYROM has concerned the Skopje authorities because the separation from the regions densely
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populated by the Albanians could lead to the partition of Macedonia between Bulgaria and 
Albania, as happened during the Second World War, but this time with the support of Turkey *
On the other hand, the probable position of FYROM in case of a military confrontation is not 
clear. The question of what power block FYROM will prefer seems to be dependent on Skopje’s 
calculations and perceptions about which neighbor is more dangerous; Albanians or Greeks, 
Bulgarians or Serbs. If Macedonian leaders regard the Albanians as the most perilous, they would 
probably take side with the Serbs who are presently troubled with their own Albanians. On the 
other hand, if Serbs are seen as the most dangerous one, an overt rapprochement between 
Albania and FYROM might come about. However the current political posturing in the region 
leaves the doors open to different formations, and urges many to analyze the case from different 
perspectives.
4.2 Balkan Alliances and the Clash of Civilizations
There are several reasons behind the aforementioned doomsday scenarios. Needless to say, the 
complexity of the ethnic composition of the region is most outstanding one among the reasons. 
On the other hand there are several authors leaving aside the problems of ethnic rights allied with 
nationalistic feelings but making the emphasis on a wider scale conflict that had existed even 
before the invention of nationalism in the region, and a conflict that is more historical in 
comparison with the current one. Moreover among those who are keen to this approach, the 
pervasive notion is that the current alliances and hostilities in the region are articulated or will be 
articulated according to the posturing that had been prevailed throughout this historical conflict.
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In the same context, some pointed out that new alignments or blocks might be formed around 
two key countries, Turkey and Greece. The two countries have been in constant arms race 
against each other since 1960s. The main factor in the prevention of the hostilities’ escalating up 
to armed confrontation has been NATO’s itself But the changing status of NATO after the 
dismemberment of the Soviet block now posed a threat to the continuation of controlled tension 
policies between the two eastern Mediterranean powers since the removal of the Soviet threat 
has gradually diminished the effectiveness and commitment of the NATO partners.^ The 
combination of the aforementioned factors helps to explain how the states within the Macedonian 
region have become locked into, a “spiraling relationship”.*®
According to some scenario the vitality of the situation lies in the fact that the Macedonian region 
or FYROM is now on the soils where these two alliances intersected. Today, it seems that the 
former alliances are revitalized once again. The Orthodox countries Serbia and Greece allied 
themselves against FYROM because they share the same irredentist designs over the territory 
thereby pushing this Slav-dominated country to seek the grant for its survival in the other front. 
At the other front, the Muslim communities, Albanians, Turks as the remnants of the Ottoman 
Empire and other Slavic Muslim elements, centuries-old inhabitants of the region who feel 
themselves closer to Turkey take their place. Albania is now a full participant of the Islamic 
Conference Organization and this organization supplied huge financial assistance to this country. 
Even though the Albanians try to exert supremacy over the other Muslims in FYROM and 
Kosovo/a regions, it is obvious that the weight of Turkey can easily be felt on this part of the
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Balkan chess board, ironically with the help of historical obsessions and hatreds of its regional 
foes like Greece.
The Turks that lived the similar problems with Greece did not lose any time and Turkey was one 
of the countries that immediately recognized Macedonia's independence and that extended its aid 
in all possible platforms. The first embassy was to Skopje was opened by Turkey in summer 
1993. Turkey also made several initiatives in the international platforms such a way as to support 
the Macedonian interests pertaining the grant of the security in the face of the growing Greco- 
Serbian threat, alleviation of the economic hardships encountered because of the Greek embargo, 
admission into CSCE, acceptance of the participation in PFP of NATO and so forth. Turkey also 
signed a Security Protocol with this country and extended some financial aid albeit it was quite 
insufficient, like 1 million dollars credit allocated by the Turkish Eximbank in 1993 ." The Greeks 
fell threatened by this Muslim block surrounding themselves from their north and east and 
perceived Orthodox Serbia as a natural ally. When Turkey and FYROM signed a military 
cooperation agreement in summer of 1994, the Greeks and the Serbs took this as a possible 
Turkish plot that aimed at containing Serbia and Greece. The Serbs and Greek leaders frequently 
expressed their concern at the creation of an allegedly Muslim-axis besieging their countries."
Acccording to the same stories, as for Bulgaria, despite its Orthodox religion, this country 
somewhat with the impacts of the lesson it received in the past seems waiting to be waiting the 
removal of the fog wrapping the Balkan scene. “Although considered as an Orthodox country, 
Bulgaria’s policies have been influenced more by its assessments of national interests rather than
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by its cultural ties with Orthodox countries” Therefore Bulgaria seems to be waiting for the 
reappearance of new opportunities to interfere.
4.3 Evaluation of the Macedonian Problem According to Great Power Involvement 
Strategies
The very characteristic of the conflict that have appeared in the region is its tendency for 
internationalization. Throughout the history the conflicts in the region invited great power 
intervention because of the geostrategic importance of the region in terms of the protection of 
national interest in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Ironically the local belligerents of the 
conflict has tried to do their best to capture the attention of external forces. The result has always 
been the death toll, atrocities, ransacking living centers and so on in extreme levels. Thus despite 
consistently changing form of the international order from bipolarity to multipolarity or vis-a 
versa, the region is likely to maintain its status as a playground for great powers.
Although the historical background of the conflict has been elaborated in the earlier chapters, it is 
obvious that the issue can be understood better if one takes into account the pattern of the great 
power involvement in the conflicts. Some experts have said that the great powers have four 
major ideal-type alternative strategies dealing with the conflicts in Eastern Europe and the 
Balkans; these are ‘competition’, ‘cooperation’, ‘dominance’ and ‘disengagement’. Accordingly, 
each strategy individually brought its approximately unchanging outcomes together. "The more 
intense the competition among the great powers in the region, the greater the autonomy of the 
small states and their ability to manipulate the powers and to extract a military and economic aid”
85
as well as the weaker the possibility to solve the problems through diplomatic channels. 
According to this theory, the Cold War protracted the solution of the Macedonian conflict.'"*
Yet several other experts hold that the existence of a cold war between the two superpowers of 
the time had domesticated the Macedonian problem by subordinating it to a secondary place in 
the face of the block interests.The most rational outcome that the problem has been frozen 
until the end of the global order dominated by the two powers which were very sensitive to even 
tinniest matters that might touch off a domino process. But since the current belligerents of the 
conflict are not the members of the rival blocks, or the goals of the blocks are now considerably 
liquidated, it is obvious that the block discipline prevailed during the Cold War is over and this 
posturing may lead to the resumption of the conflict that has been frozen up today.
Second pattern of this theory ‘cooperation’ among the great powers. Probable results of this sort 
of great power approach is, as the history proved, narrowing of the gap within which smaller 
states can maneuver, and exert autonomy, thereby easing the mitigation of the conflicts involved. 
In this framework, peacemaking efforts of the great powers are more effective than are in the 
competitive type of involvement, though cooperating great powers are sometimes incapable of 
preventing completely an occasional resort to violence by a regional actor. Obviously the most 
convenient sample to this pattern is the Contact Group that could pave the way to the Dayton 
Agreement.
Third pattern is ‘disengagement’ that probably mean the insulation of the great powers from 
regional conflicts and persistence of the conflict as long as the regional actors can continue to
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sustain it through their own sources. This type of great power involvement has frequently 
culminated in the rise of a regional hegemon or hegemons. The initial stance of the US and the 
Europeans to the Balkanic crisis including Macedonia had fitted to this pattern. Last one is 
‘dominance’ implying the preponderance of an external power over the regional actors thereby 
reducing them into a secondary position and having them to cast an unimportant role in the 
settlement or resolution of the conflicts. Thus “the greater the small states’ vulnerability and 
dependence on the hegemon’s power, the more will the hegemon be able to manage regional 
conflicts effectively and to prevent violence”.^ * For now this sort of hegemonic power is not 
available in the region.
On the other hand, the main question to be asked should be, in this context, what sort of 
implications can the independence of FYROM and the revival of the Macedonian question 
produce? If the matter is handled under the light of the aforementioned insights, we can conclude 
that although the discussion is tentative because the incidents pass by in high speed, the 
framework put forth here will help identify several patterns that have emerged so far with regard 
to this conflict. Accordingly, many analysts expected that the end of the Cold War would lead to 
great power cooperation as the preferred strategy vis-a-vis local conflicts such as those in the 
Balkans. “Such cooperation could take place in the form of either a revitalized great power 
concert or pan-European collective security institutions such as the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) or some combination of the two forms ’’'^
But the inertia on the part of the westerners, as the Bosnia war proved, in the first phase of the 
Balkan crisis following the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the dominant great power strategy was
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‘disengagement’ until summer of 1995, the date when the UN and the other great powers’ 
prestige was about to be destroyed with the fall of the safe havens under the heavy Serbian 
artillery fire.^° The shift that took place from that date onward indebted its existence to the US 
government that was mostly spurred by its own public opinion that reacted to the scenes of 
massacre on television screens. The dominant US role was made possible by the superior US 
capabilities, although the US interest were respectively lower than those of its European
partners. 21
4.3.1 The American Leadership, Great Power Competition and the Macedonian Problem
In the Macedonian case the Americans took the lead once again as in the Bosnian crisis. The US 
strategies targeted at the northern part of the Balkans frequently met with the objections of 
Russia which urged Washington not to do something that may restart Cold War in the Balkans. 
On the other hand a possible conflict in the south concerned the US in that it might evolve into a 
epidemic disease that could infect Greece and Turkey. For Washington, a multinational state like 
FYROM situated on the soils where the two civilizations; Orthodox Christianity and House of 
Islam, intersect each other, might cushion the undesirable complications of ongoing clash of 
civilizations. Yet the same FYROM itself constituted a very point of conflict that might spark off 
and deteriorate the same clash. “If a war were fought over its territory, it was likely that the 
conflict would quickly assume some characteristics of an ethnic and religious war such as 
Bosnia’s.”^^  The spillover of the struggle into the Aegean Sea thereby dragging the NATO 
members Turkey and Greece into the rival fronts might posed a great blow to American interests 
in Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Despite the fact that one of the member of the EU
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situated in the region, the EU had never been concerned with the conflict in the southern Balkans 
as much as did the American government.
Although, initially, during the Bosnian crisis, Washington thought that “the spark that would kick 
off a wider Balkan war was Kosovo/a”,^  ^ this perception was replaced with the understanding 
that for the Serbs defenseless Macedonia was in the bag, and that Milosevic was too clever to 
open a new front in the south, in Kosovo/a while Serbia was preoccupied with the north. Then 
the American representations intensified their efforts in Tirana, Athens, Skopje, Ankara and 
Sofia. The US State Department decided to sent 500 marines to Macedonia to avoid constant 
Serbian encroachment on Macedonia's territory. This force received its orders from Washington 
rather than the UN Peacekeeping Mission of which they were a part.^^
Concomitantly the US government tried to persuade everyone that all of these attempts were part 
of a grandiose project that aimed at bringing stability and peace to the region. Holbrooke, the 
architect of the Dayton Peace, also underlined this fact. By early September 1995, Athens and 
Skopje seemed to have come closed to an agreement following the shift of the government in 
Greece However, the unexpected interruption of the negotiations that come from the Greek side, 
resulted in Holbrooke’s handling the reins. Finally, Holbrooke managed to bring the parties to the 
negotiation table in New York and to extract an interim accord, leaving aside the name issue and 
envisaging the two countries to forge diplomatic relations. “Holbrooke was interested in an 
agreement particularly because he saw it as the prevention of possible spillover into a larger 
Balkan area and as an indication to the warring factions in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia that a 
wider Balkan settlement was attainable.” ®^
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Many authors saw the signature of the interim accord in the same context, and pointed out that 
once the Dayton Agreement alleviated the nationalistic passions in Croatia, Bosnia and 
particularly Serbia, through lifting the embargo and opening the way to recover the ransacking 
economies of the former combatants, it decreased the possibility of transformation of the conflict 
between the Kosovar Albanians and the Serbs into an armed confrontation that might threaten 
the security of FYROM. Because it is clear that the economic hardships feed the ultra-nationalist 
flank in Serbia headed by Vojislav Seselj who claims that he can solve the Kosovo/a problem 
with more radical measures. Unfortunately, in sharply contrast, the recent Albanian-Serbian war 
which broke out in March 1998 has indicated that the Albanians who have been very 
disappointed with the provisions of the Dayton Agreement entailing the future status of 
Kosovo/a, have resolved to force their way with other means.
4.3.2 The European Response to the Macedonian Problem
At the onset of the Yugoslavia crisis the main priority of the European capitals was the 
affirmation of the principle that the republican and the Yugoslav borders would not be changed 
by force. During the conference of the EC foreign ministers held in the Netherlands in early 
August 1991, this stance was approved. In the EC-sponsored meeting at the Hague under the 
aegis of NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington in which the presidents of the six republics 
and the collective presidency (eight members) participated, the Yugoslav representatives 
expected the support of the EC for the peaceful restructuring of their country. However, the 
European representatives could not come to a compromise on the future course of the EC 
policies regarding Yugoslavia.^*
90
This situation altered with the emergence of the new Macedonian question and vociferous Greek 
campaign which urged the EC to take side with Athens. From the outset, the EC had to assign 
some of its energy to placating the concern of the Greeks. Meanwhile Germany ignored the 
Macedonian case and called for the immediate recognition of Croatia and Slovenia “as a moral 
gesture honoring the right to self-determination. But the same logic could not to be applied to 
Macedonia. The efforts of the EC to furnish a common ground for the combatants to put an end 
to the hostilities between them were ephemeral. Therefore the EC decided to highlight its stance 
by setting up a committee, the so-called Badinter Committee, that would evaluate if the 
Yugoslav republics fulfilled the conditions for recognition or not. The decision was taken 
particularly because many in the Western capitals believed that the official recognition was the 
only way to help the republic economically.^® But, after April 1993 when international 
recognition was granted to FYROM, the economic and military aid in expected level was not 
forthcoming.
Obviously the EC’s effort to control and contain the collapse of Yugoslavia was ephemeral and 
the impact of the Community was quite negative. “Brussels developed a ‘parochial, self- 
interested outlook and avoidance behavior’ in regards to further involvement in the Balkans.” *^ 
"The EU developed a ‘Little Europe’ mentality towards Yugoslavia by clearing itself of its 
responsibility on the bloodshed during the dissolution crisis. The decision of the EU by the 
middle of 1996 exemplified this stance. In the decision, the associate membership of FYROM to 
the EU, wholehearted expectation of Skopje as the prize of its loyalty to the UN sanctions and 
Western policies toward new Yugoslavia, was conditioned with the regional cooperation of the
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ex-Yugoslav republics and Albania. The statements that came from Brussels shocked the 
Macedonian leadership.
The Macedonians started to receive the European assistance only after the normalization of 
relations with Greece. The EU extended its financial aid and loans within the framework of its 
PHARE program to this tiny country to repair its war-time losses. '^* Recently FYROM and the 
EU signed a Financial Protocol through which this country would receive 150 million ECU by 
the year 2000. The protocol is one of the measures the EU committed to within the framework of 
Trade and Cooperation Agreement which has become effective since January 1, 1998 The 
protocol is regarded as a step to strengthen the legal administrative prerequisites for admission to 
the EU. Although the EU's stance is not so promising and it is clear that it will take so long time 
for FYROM to be admitted to the EU, and the agenda could not extend further than the 
association membership, so-called Treaty on Collaboration that run into force from the first day 
of 1998 entrenches the hopes for ultimate goal.
Another initiative developed by the EU is the ‘Royaumont Process’. This process represents an 
initiative for cooperation among the southeastern countries. It has been established within the EU 
in December 1995, and its membership now counts eleven countries including FYROM. The 
basic goals of the process are accelerating and intensifying the regional cooperation from various 
aspects, financing various projects in different fields. Another main objective of the process is to 
strengthen stability and good neighborliness in southern Europe.^* However, the process that can 
be interpreted as an initiative within the framework of the CFSP of the EU seems to have 
remained considerably inefficient.
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4.3.2.1 The Working Group on Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities of the 
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia
The European initiatives are not limited to financial aid. The problems leaving outside the 
economic difficulties of the country have been handled in some platforms like the International 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia andOSCE. Under the mandate of the International 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia the Working Group under the chairmanship of the German 
ambassador, Geert Ahrens, began its work in October 1991, initiating negotiations between the 
ethnic Albanians and the Macedonian government on the matter of Albanian territorial autonomy. 
The negotiations carried out under the scrutiny of the Working Group aimed at the find a balance 
between the demands of the ethnic Albanians and Macedonians’. The outcome of the meetings 
was the persuasion of the Albanian representatives not to pursue secessionist policies but rather 
to accept co-existence within the boundaries of the country as citizens. The Working Group also 
managed to convince Skopje to increase the number of Albanian-language schools as well as of 
broadcasting in Albanian.^®
Ambassador Ahrens was also influential in starting the negotiations between the Skopje 
authorities and the Albanian leadership on the draft decree of local self-administration after the 
Tetovo University’s opening and ensuing violence. In addition, Ahrens touched on one of the 
most blatant matters in the eyes of the Albanians by suggesting the holding of a new census but 
this time under the supervision of the Council of Europe. In order to prevent any boycott against 
the new census to be held the ambassador constantly contacted the leaders of the Albanian 
community.^’ The work of the Group was not limited to the Albanian affairs; in 1993 the
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Working Group leaned to the grievances of the Serbian minority of FYROM. The deepening 
crisis between Skopje and the ethnic Serbs with the declaration of a Serbian republic within the 
boundaries of FYROM could be overcome with the strenuous efforts of Ahrens, and the Serbs 
were persuaded to rule out the separation option. At the end of the negotiations of the so-called 
“Agreed Minutes”, Ahrens called on the Macedonian government to recognize constitutional
38minority status to its ethnic Serbs.
4.3.2.2 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the 
Macedonian Problem
The OSCE employed two types of mechanism to find a durable solution to the aforementioned 
problems of FYROM. First one was the formation of a “Spillover Mission” in late September 
1992 which was mandated to carry out activities of preventive diplomacy. This was mostly 
because of the failure of the European Union to send an observer mission to Macedonia because 
of a possible Greek veto, within the framework of the decision taken during the 16th Council of 
Senior Officials of the organization. The main goal of the Mission was monitoring, and if needed, 
mediating between the protagonists. Monitoring activities covered assessing internal and external 
threat to the stability of the country including Kosovo/a, growing ethnic and social tensions, the 
impact of refugees, and stability of political institutions. OSCE officials also could hold trips to 
several segments of the country to find out potential sources of social and political unrest.
The mediation function of the Mission was carried out by the OSCE’s High Commissioner on 
National Minorities Max van der Stoel. The fact-finding activities of Stoel contributed to the
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objectives of the Spillover Mission because he managed to persuade the protagonists to take 
some positive steps in the inter-ethnic conflict.For example following his visit on 28-29 March 
1995, Stoel made some proposal about the university in Albanian language. In his report to the 
Macedonian Foreign Minister, van der Stoel underlined the insufficiency of the current measures, 
like implementing a quota system for Albanians and the establishment of a pedagogical faculty in 
the Albanian language in Skopje. Pointing to the involved articles of the Macedonian constitution 
and underlining the relevant passages of CSCE’s 1990 Copenhagen Document that had been built 
upon the human rights of national minorities promulgated formerly in the Helsinki Final Act of 
1975,'“’ van der Stoel promptly criticized the rejection of Skopje to permit the establishment of 
Tetovo University. He also suggested the establishment of a trilingual (English, Macedonian and 
Albanian ) Higher Education Center for Public Administration and Business by hoping that it 
would defuse ongoing ethnic tensions there.“”
The OSCE has managed to have accepted some of its projects on the matter as reflected in ‘the 
Project Nulta Year’ which should facilitate future Albanian students to go through the entrance 
exams at both faculties in FYROM to commence in September of 1998 in three high schools. 
The calming relations with Albania under the Socialists’ rule seems to have eased the Skopje 
authorities' concerns and encouraged them to take bolder steps in the education matter. The 
government decision allowing tertiary education in Albanian through Pedagogical Faculty may 
lead to the legalization of the Tetovo University as well.'^  ^All these steps are the fhiits of van der 
Stoel’s team as well as the two capitals that came to realize the threats, which the recalcitrance 
on the matter may bring about to both nations.
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For the first time in its history the UN deployed a task force whose mission was to prevent 
emergence of a conflict. The UN has always taken the prevention of conflicts as its majestic 
objective. However, the UN operations were always implemented after the breakout of 
hostilities. The most often used technique was the diplomatic measures and economic sanctions. 
In 1992 the theoretical concept of the preventive diplomacy was introduced by the UN Secretary 
General Boutros-Ghali. In the report he prepared under the title of ‘Agenda for Peace’ upon the 
request of the UN Security Council, Boutros-Ghali highlighted the future course of the 
organization in tackling with post-Cold War era conflicts.'*'* The report addressed three critical 
areas, namely, preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace-keeping. It was asserted that the 
preventive diplomacy aimed at fulfilling three important objectives: the prevention of violent 
conflict, the prevention of conflict escalation, and the containment of the conflict once it has 
started. The report also endorsed close cooperation between the UN and other regional 
organizations'**
Upon the Macedonian President's suggestion, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution 795 
dated 11 December 1992, by taking into account the possibility of spillover of an ethnic conflict 
in Kosovo/a inside FYROM, envisaging the preventive deployment of the UN peace-keepers 
along the borderline between FYROM and Albania and the FR Yugoslavia. The Resolution was 
based on four justifications; “the potential for instability in the country as well as the threat to its 
territory; the possible developments which could undermine confidence and stability in the former 
Yugoslavia; to provide further support for a CSCE mission; to fulfill the request of Macedonian
4.3.3 The United Nations and UNPREDEP
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President Gligorov for a UN presence in order to avoid a spillover of conflict from the Yugoslav
war. 46
The task of the mission was the monitoring the developments affecting the stability and security 
of FYROM and reporting to the UN.'*’ Besides, the force assumed the function of deterrence by 
increasing the costs of a possible Serbian aggression. Initially the mission was called 
UNPROFOR same with the other missions in Croatia and Bosnia. But then, on 31 March 1995 
the name of the mission was changed by the UN Security Council’s Resolution 983 to 
UNPREDEP to bold the unique nature of its mission. UNPREDEP was authorized to carry out 
the activities entailing military and civilian phases of the problems for which the force was sent.'** 
Under the heading of military mandate it assumed the function of early-warning through air and 
land reconnaissance, and deterrence. On the other hand the force has not so far engaged in any 
serious confrontation particularly in border encounters. Of the most frequently met incidents have 
been border encroachments due to lack of physical barriers separating the two countries. The 
military mandate of the force was to be renewed every six m onths.Although the relations 
between FYROM and Greece began to develop in positive direction after the interim accord 
signed in late 1995, and mostly thanks to the sensible policies of President Gligorov, Serbian 
military threat considerably diminished considerably, some of the underlying roots for conflict, 
particularly on an ethnic level remained. For this reason the UN Security Council in its 
Resolution 1027 on 30 November 1995 extended UNPREDEP’s mandate in this country until 30 
May 1996.
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However the expiry dates of the mission’s mandate has seen blatant debates between Moscow 
that recognizes the mission including the US troops, as designed to acquire full control over the 
region, and the Western capitals. Moscow’s concerns merit attention because for the first time in 
its history a major contingent of US soldiers takes part in a UN peacekeeping activity. Although 
the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher statement on 11 June 1993 during NATO Foreign 
Ministers meeting in Athens that the US troops would assume a symbolic function,^* the presence 
of US soldier in FYROM overtly alarmed Moscow. The signature of the Dayton Agreement 
deepened further the debacle on the matter. At the end of November 1996 the UN Security 
Council passed Resolution no; 1082, providing the contingent of 1050 troops serving in 
UNPREDEP force in FYROM to be reduced by 300. The US government and the European 
capitals had wanted to keep the force at its original strength. But the delegation of the Russian 
Federation had argued that after the signature of the Dayton Agreement, there remained no threat 
to the security of the southern Balkans. Therefore there was no need for a peacekeeping force in 
the region. Resolution 1082 was a compromise between the two sides. However, with the 
outbreak of the Albanian crisis in early 1997 the implication of the Resolution seemed unclear 
Albanian crisis led the Macedonian government to appeal to the UN Secretary General to 
suspend the reduction of force because of the appearance of the threat of mass immigration from 
Albania inside Macedonia. On the other hand the current crisis in Kosovo/a between the 
Albanians and the Serbs might endanger the security of Macedonia.
The force’s mission carries civilian aspects as well. UNPREDEP’s civilian mandate was created 
on 31 March 1994 by the Security Council Resolution 908 and involved with facilitation of 
political dialogue between the protagonists. The monitoring of political, social and economic
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conditions were the tasks entailing the civilian phase of the force. In the same context 
UNPREDEP actively participated in the monitoring of the parliamentary and presidential 
elections that was held in October 1994,”  as well as offered its services in the humanitarian relief 
projects and dissemination of information to the public. However the most important task of 
UNPREDEP was to keep the communication and dialogue channels between the protagonists 
open. The practical outcome of this function was that it furnished the means to the UN for an 
early intervention in case of a serious conflict in Macedonia.*^
As a final word, in contrast to the disappointment experienced with similar deployments in 
various parts of former Yugoslavia, UNPREDEP constitutes a relative success. On the other 
hand, the force has never been tested as yet, and the eligibility of the force to tackle with a 
serious conflict is still questionable. However it is obvious that the security requirements of 
FYROM can probably be met by admission of this country to NATO.
4.3.4 Macedonia's Search for NATO Membership
Skopje considers full membership in NATO is a deserved prize for this country’s peaceful 
acquisition of its independence, as well as its constant support to the West during the Bosnian 
Crisis despite all negative outcomes for the weak economy of the country. The last incidents have 
proved that FYROM needs urgent help in the protection of its territorial integrity. In this 
framework NATO seems to be the most convenient security organization to provide Macedonia 
with the military means and diplomatic pledges it can use for its survival. Thus the Skopje 
authorities try to evaluate every opportunity to make joint action with NATO easier. The
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Macedonians hope that the US will become their NATO patron, supplying equipment and 
training.”
To this end, the US and FYROM closely cooperate. Now FYROM is a member of Partnership 
for Peace (PFP) program and Skopje sends its officers to attend the military training program the 
PFP offers. The most outstanding distinction of FYROM’s status with the other members of the 
PFP program is the fact that this country is not invited to the missions in Bosnia joined by the 
PFP members like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic -or declared candidates for full 
membership to the organization.”  The capacity of the country to participate in such missions 
abroad is one of the most important conditions for the acceptance to the program. In addition it 
is underlined that adherence to NATO requires not only the participation of the Macedonian 
troops in these missions, but also the accommodation of all the military apparatus of the country 
to NATO standards.”  It is obvious that for FYROM it means beginning from the scratch.
On the other hand, particularly European partners of the alliance still continues to drag their feet 
in the acceptance of FYROM. At the 1995 NATO ministerial conference in Madrid, Macedonian 
Foreign Minister Frckovski had proposed the inclusion of FYROM together with Albania the 
most favored country for the membership at the time. But the Paris negotiations in May 1996 
indicated that Macedonia’s expectations would not be fulfilled until the first decades of the next 
millennium and inflated expectations NATO would embark upon the task of the creation of a 
“South Wing” with the inclusion of Albania, FYROM and Bulgaria has at the time being seemed 
vague.** Furthermore the outbreak of a semi-civil war in Albania in 1997 dashed the hopes
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Now the Europeans are not interested in the fact that the country is a hostage in the hands of 
terror wrapping the region that can be saved only by being taken under the wings of NATO, but 
a possible partner that in future may give much stomachache because of the existence of an 
unpleasant Albanian community.*® It is obvious that the mercurial phase of political agenda of the 
former Yugoslavia and Albania fans the debates on Skopje’s membership and strengthens the 
hands of those opposed its membership. European capitals question some blatant matters that 
NATO will have to address; What sort of outcomes can a possible Serbo-Albanian clash in 
Kosovo/a bring about for NATO that already pledged FYROM its territorial integrity. Is NATO 
prepared to respond to a possible Serbian or Bulgarian aggression and so forth.
Last years' incidents in Albania indicated to what extend the NATO can afford to take step for 
Macedonia’s security. The quagmire into which Berisha government rolled itself dissuaded 
NATO’s European partners to extend its hands to this country along with FYROM, thereby 
leaving the US as the sole partner that is able to diagnose the complaints of the country regarding 
security matters. In this framework, while the European capitals are concerned largely with 
bilateral economic relations, Skopje finds NATO as the most convenient organization through 
which it can huddle under the American security umbrella in case of a threat from its neighbors.®®
The decision-makers at NATO headquarters are concerned with the relations of this country with 
its neighbors. As it has been mentioned, FYROM has conflictual relations with Bulgaria and most 
importantly with Greece. Since the matter is a value-based conflict for Skopje the conciliatory 
steps to be taken fall to the neighbors of the country. In this vein, that the same thing is 
conditioned for Bulgaria, is a chance for the forging of positive relations between the two
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countries. Despite its volatile domestic politics, Bulgaria is now the star of the West in the region 
essentially after disappointment of the experience with Albania. Sofia now highlights its tolerant 
and sensible approach to the Macedonian issue along with other conflagrant issues like the 
treatment of its Turkish minority in its official statements to pose a responsible capital to the 
West. After the UDF victory, the following purge of the communist nomenclature in almost all 
administrative posts, including the Exarchate, exhibits the full commitments of Sofia to the 
Western-type democracy and capitalist economic structure. The economic performance of 
Bulgaria against all odds is now applauded by the Westerners’ financial organization, primarily 
IMF, and the EU granted Sofia its full membership in the second lapse of the expansion process 
of the union.
Although the concerns of the Bulgarians are still alive, it seems that the problem is now 
undergoing some sort of moratorium for the sake of the membership in the Western clubs. 
Bulgaria is now one of the members of the Partnership for Peace program -the declared first step 
to the full membership in NATO- and reiterated its commitment to the goal of becoming a 
respectful country within the framework of Euro-Atlantic relations. Therefore, in Bulgaria, the 
political forces like the governing UDF coalition and even socialists who are opposed to 
NATOmembership, do not afford to sacrifice the aforementioned objectives to a respectively 
second-class matter like language crisis with FYROM.
On the Greek front, after the signature of the agreement in New York, the remained problem, the 
name issue, came to be marginalized and Athens now seems to be weary of this meaningless feud 
and eager to leave the matter to the initiative of the UN mediators. It is obvious that the Greeks’
1 0 2
changing strategy has resulted from the fact that Athens came to realize that the FR Yugoslavia- 
Serbia seems to be a stand-still potential threat to the security of all countries in the region, 
including even Greece itself -the most loyal aide of Milosevic during the Bosnian crisis. It shall be 
irrational to think that Greece vvill welcome the neighborhood of this country along its northern 
border. Thus Athens felt the need to make a diplomatic maneuver to redress the mistakes of the 
former strategy and began to endorse the admittance of FYROM to the organization.®* The 
recent clashes in Kosovo/a seems to have increased the concerns of Athens. With the tacit 
aspirations of Belgrade and under the pressure of the UN and the US, the Greek government 
now seeks to save itself from the name issue with FYROM as soon as possible.®^
The debate concerning what sort of task NATO will assume in FYROM has intensified as the 
expiry date of UNPREDEP mission approaches. Skopje advocates that NATO should assume a 
new form of responsibility, preventing aggression on FYROM and promoting its integration to 
the Euro-Atlantic structures.®  ^ Although Washington seems to be open to such an arrangement, 
in the way of landing on NATO troops in place of UNPREDEP’s, there are some obstacles. One 
of them is the Russian Federation’s objections to the American troops allegedly behind the mask 
of NATO task force arrangement or else. Moscow has been opposed to the present deployment, 
and after its deployment, to the extension of its mandate in FYROM. It is obvious that Moscow 
perceives the approach of Washington as a new American plot that destines the US domination in 
the region. For this reason, Russia, under the pressure of the European capitals that irked from 
the recent Kosovo/a incidents, is expected to support at least the extension of the mandate of 
UNPREDEP beyond August 1998, the expiration date, instead of letting NATO troops coming 
there.
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At the time being NATO discusses the ideas of forming a training center in FYROM in Krivolak 
as well as forming joint military units of Greece, Bulgaria, FYROM and Albania. However the 
recent meeting of the five Balkan countries high military experts in Ankara to discuss the project 
regarding the establishment of a Balkan Force, a rapid reaction force, that will be used in case of 
critical situations in the region, brought to the fore the geographical convenience of FYROM for 
this sort of missions. '^* Initially Ankara advocated Edime, and Bulgaria Plovdiv as the place for 
the headquarters of this force, the Macedonia option gained support of both the US government 
and the other participants owing to its closeness to the possible conflict centers in the Balkans 
like Kosovo/a, Sanjak and Vojvodina. The US is still maintaining a military base near the airport 
of Skopje, thus the Macedonia option does not seem to be very remote.®*
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION
The crises in the Balkans, following the collapse of the bipolar world order which had prevailed 
since 1950s, belied those who thought that the terror age was now over and the new world order 
to be established would not permit such tragedies. Ironically, the alleged new order has hosted 
real humanity tragedies particularly in the Balkan peninsula and continues to do so; now the TV 
screens are full with the scenes reflected the ransacking cities, villages whose smokes can only be 
seen in a secure distance because skirmishes are still going on, mourning women, hungry and 
thirsty children, desperate elders, concentration camps, mass graves and constant fighting. The 
culprit of all is frequently introduced us as insane nationalism. However others stress on the 
geostrategic importance of the regions for the sake of which the armies encounter, put forth 
scenarios on the changing balance of power among the combatants frequently as the proxies of 
greater powers, and claim that all the tragedies are the results of vivid minds.
Success of those who can merge these two approaches is clear in the Macedonian case. To 
answer the question why the region, so called Macedonia, and its inhabitants had been and are 
still a problem, one should glance at to what extend the sources of problem have changed or 
evolved so far. The first chapter and second chapter of this study dwelled upon the historical 
events within the framework of the problem, distinguishes two important factors; the problem of 
identity, and behind it, the geostrategic importance of the region for the neighboring nations and 
great powers concerned about their interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. 
Therefore, its features give the region the status of a test area for the new world order.
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Although the aforementioned factors are the forerunners one should make emphasis on a 
precondition for them. In other words, the intensification of the struggle around the factors 
thereof, always required the existence of an ailing power that had held the control of the region 
through some sort of social contract as was the case in the Ottomans’ ‘millet system’, or ‘iron 
fist’ rule as was under the reins of Alexander’s Kingdom of Three Nations, or a system that 
neglected racial and ecclesiastical lines along which the nations of the region became rifted and 
hostile to each other, and that in its place, united them under the flag of one ideology envisaging 
brotherhood and co-ownership over all prosperity their fertile countries offered them as did in 
Tito’s Socialist Yugoslavia.
The stability in the region had always been dependent on the skill of the rulers in keeping keg 
powder away from the fire in that the mentioned systems therein laid the seeds of their own 
destruction. The millet system provided the nations under jurisdiction of the Ottomans with the 
means that were useful in the protection of their separate identity, particularly like education, and 
eased the infiltrating nationalist ideologies in the nineteenth century to undermine the five- 
century-long Ottoman rule. The brutal serbianization policy of King Alexander in the 1920s 
alienated more the localities to the notion that they were actually Serbs. In addition, first 
brigandates, and then war time campaigns of the Serbs, Bulgarians and Greeks since 1870s had 
already extinguished the localities’ reserve of goodwill. This atmosphere eased Tito to create a 
nation within the concerns of the political goals at the time. Tito’s concern derived mostly from 
one of the fundamentals of socialist ideology to which he was wholeheartedly loyal; ‘the right of 
self determination’. If the inhabitants of the region identify themselves as Serb or Bulgarian, then
106
his plans that envisaged putting an end to the Serbian dominancy in the South-Slav politics would 
be upset, or a strategically important portion of his Yugoslavia would go to Bulgaria. By making 
nation the localities of a region whose even boundaries were disputable, Tito did prepare ground 
for irredentist projects targeted Greece as well, thereby leaving the events down to the slippery 
slope.
After the Second World War and the removal of the dust covered the stage of Balkan politics, 
the Macedonian problem disguised into a respectively less significant domestic problem of the 
socialist Yugoslavia. In international arena, as long as Belgrade tighten the reins, Macedonia 
could not become a reason of tension with Greece and Bulgaria. The block discipline urged both 
Athens and Sofia to approach painstakingly to the matter though the feelings remained dormant. 
However, the endgame of the Cold War and the collapse of the communist regimes one after the 
other awakened the problem once again from its slumber. The Macedonian problem was once 
again internationalizing because Macedonia became a sovereign state, who had borders with 
Albanians, and Serbs, and a population the identity of which was disputable, and whose name, 
constitution were provocative and increased the anxiety of the Greeks and Bulgarians.
Revival of the old animosities in a different world order was derived from the fact that the nations 
which were once the belligerents to the conflict fell under the rule of the communist regimes, 
except Greeks, before maturated their nation-building process. The communism was a long sleep 
for the myths, attributions, stereotypes and so forth, the elements enhanced the dynamism of 
nationalist propaganda. In addition, the physical borders of the nations were ignored and 
furthermore this setting was promoted under the communist regimes because at the end of the
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socialism process there would be neither state nor nations. The incessant affection of the Serbs to 
Kosovo, the constant debate between the Bulgarians, Greeks and the Macedonians on the 
identity of the history of the region, the Grand Albania projects all of them reappeared with the 
liquidation of communism and replacement of it by nationalism.
On the other hand the reappearance of the Macedonian Question in international arena seems to 
have provided the powerful states that nominated themselves as the founders of the new world 
order in the post-Cold War era, and international organizations which are expected to assume 
more vital roles in the settlement or resolution of the international problems with a test case. The 
US, EU and the Russian Federation cooperated in the settlement of the Gulf Crisis. But the 
Yugoslav crisis indicated to what extend the powers involved are unable to transpass the barriers 
that the centuries-old rivalries constructed, on behalf of the fundamentals of the new world order. 
On the other hand, the Macedonian problem albeit it did not have the great powers encountered 
with each other, was again within the same framework. Having ignored the peril of obliteration 
of this tiny country, the European Union, by bounding to the principles entailing the application 
of common foreign and security policy that were stipulated in the Maastrciht Treaty took side 
with Greece, as if an excuse to their untidy policies toward the Bosnian Crisis. Having concerned 
with the possibility that the spillover of fire in the Bosnia Herzegovina and probably in Kosovo 
inside this country may drag the two NATO member countries into a general war, the US 
policies were different and in the eyes of Moscow, provocative.
It is obvious that the recently sparked Kosovo crisis has deteriorated the situation furthermore. 
Because Macedonia, albeit all its governments painstaking policies, contains an important
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discontent Albanian population having familial affiliations with those in Albania and Kosovo. 
The Kosovo crisis indicated that even the existence of a moderate and non-provocative 
leadership could not prevent the escalation of the incidents into uncontrollable levels like in 
Kosovo. On the other hand the possibility that the defeat at the Kosovo front may urge the 
Albanians to compensate this loss with a portion from the FYROM is still disturbing. The 
painstaking policies of Aliti created its own rival and nobody can estimate to what extend the 
Albanian policies can be sharpened. On the other hand, economic hardships are still playing in the 
hands of the hawks leading by the VMRO-DPMNE. Despite remained in the level of gossip, the 
news involving illegal militia forces reportedly active in the parts of the country where are 
densely populated by the Albanians and some recent bombing incidents in the FYROM assumed 
by the KLA indicate the vitality of the problem.
Among all, there are some positive developments invoking the security and economic 
requirements of the country. Balkan countries, including even Greece from the temporary 
agreement in New York onward, meet the concerns of the FYROM with understanding now and 
extend their support to the US efforts that plan to bring the peace and stability to the Balkans as 
a whole and that aimed at the amelioration of the involved grievances of the republic through PfP 
and other military cooperation forms. Though insufficient, the EU funds from the PHARE 
program help the FYROM to rehabilitate its ransacking economy due to the Yugoslav and Greek 
embargoes. The carrot and stick policies of the EU and the NATO also have Bulgaria come to 
the terms of the game. Hence the most important external threat seems coming from Milosevic's 
Serbia. However, against all this setting nobody can guarantee that in the face of the rising 
Albanian unrest Skopje can engage in a rapprochement with Belgrade.
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As a final word, Macedonia still constitutes a problem in international arena, as much as in the 
other countries of the world that host different ethnicities within their borders. The misfortune of 
this country is derived from the fact that it is situated among the nations who remained loyal to the 
heritage of the past which is occupied by the glory of the vast empires and hatreds of the 
unbearable defeats; the nations that could not mature their nation-building processes yet. The 
mercurian chracter of Balkan politics renders probable the whole scenarios putting Macedonia 
either into the block of Western powers or the block of the past the boundaries of which are 
determined by clash of civilizations. Yet one thing can be apprehended clearly, a Macedonian 
nation, whatever its racial roots, is now present and the feeling of belonged to the Macedonian 
nation strenthens mostly thanks to the intransigence of its neighbors not to recognize this identity. 
Nevertheless only the creation of a Macedonian citizenry can ensure the survival of this tiny 
Balkan state because of the rising Albanian nationalism in the region. So far the moderate Skopje 
authorities have seemed to eager to do so. It is obviously the last chance for Skopje not to be 
swallowed by the historical blocks that plunged into constant hostilities whose impacts can be 
easily be felt today.
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